The US Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 36

tioning from Congress and the articulate opposition of a large portion of
the scientific and international community regarding the legality of this
use of “nonlethal weapons”? Would sacrificing BW be a small price to
pay in order to retain a CW capability? Did the lukewarm attitude of the
military toward BW play a role? Despite reservations regarding BW, the
JCS argued fairly tenaciously for retaining the option of using them in re-
taliation. Nevertheless, Secretary of Defense Laird insisted on total aboli-
tion. Nixon agreed. It is puzzling that in his memoirs the former president
did not mention this praiseworthy achievement. 136
Other factors influenced American policymakers: the US renunciation
would encourage the adoption of a universal ban and, hopefully, per-
suade the Soviets to follow suit. The fear of proliferation had grown: BW
could prove attractive to poorer countries that could not afford to match
the great powers by developing nuclear weapons. Among some policy-
makers, there were moral considerations: biological weapons were ab-
horrent. And finally, what the US was giving up by destroying its stock-
pile was not substantial in comparison with its chemical and nuclear
reserves. Its destruction would not deprive the US of a well-developed
weapon system.
The decision to abandon toxins went through the same process as the
decision to end the BW program. On 21 January 1970 the Interdepart-
mental Political-Military Group delivered its report which began by de-
fining toxins as “chemical substances.” 137 On 14 February 1970, after a
furious intragovernment debate over whether toxins were chemicals or
biologicals, President Nixon followed up the renunciation of BW with a
renunciation of toxin weapons.
In 1975 the US ratified the BWC and, after a 50-year delay, the Ge-
neva Protocol—following an extended debate with Senate leaders over
whether the Protocol banned the use of herbicides and riot control agents
in war. In August 1969 the Department of the Army terminated all pro-
duction of BW. The order to destroy the weapons followed. It was swiftly
accomplished. 138
A cache of deadly weapons, however, escaped attention. The CIA re-
tained several agents in its refrigerating units, including cobra venom
and saxitoxin. Although the cache was subsequently discovered and de-
stroyed, the organization expressed no regret at having held it. 139
The reaction of the BW community to the end of the offensive program