The US Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 30

The question of how biological agents would be used was largely
treated in a speculative and hypothetical manner. There was, however,
one detailed Pentagon plan that integrated the use of BW into an inva-
sion of Cuba: the Marshall Plan. 106 No comparable plans were drawn
against the USSR or Communist China.
Preparedness
Throughout the five years following World War II, a number of reviews
assessed the CBR capability of the United States, emphasizing the vulner-
ability of the US to BW attack and the need to build a retaliatory capabil-
ity and to conduct a vigorous CBW R&D program. These reports had a
common theme: the US was not prepared, offensively or defensively, for
CBW attack. The lack of a reliable retaliatory weapon was decried.
The Stevenson Report had the greatest impact on the US CBW pro-
gram. On 30 June 1950 it urged a major emphasis on BW preparedness
and concluded that “the United States should be prepared to defend itself
against biological warfare and to wage biological warfare offensively.” 107
From 1945 to 1950, BW preparedness was complicated by a number of
overall problems. As Miller observes, “Many authorities were agreed that
the efficiency of biological weapons would never be known short of ac-
tual use in large-scale military operations and that until that time any
evaluation could only be an 'educated guess.'” 108
During the period 1945-1950, the policy of retaliation and the empha-
sis on the development of conventional and nuclear weapons discour-
aged attention to more esoteric and untried weapons. “As a result, funds
were limited, and research and development did not progress to the point
where BW could be incorporated in firm military plans.” 109
Moreover, deployment overseas posed serious logistical problems:
given that such munitions were highly vulnerable to temperature condi-
tions, how could the viability of the agents be preserved during both
transport and storage abroad, to assure their effectiveness if needed? 110
As a result of such problems, the development of BW remained largely
stalled “in the research and development phase.” 111 Coordination among
the services lagged. The CmlC found it difficult to implement the pre-
paredness directives of the DOD. Private industry was unenthusiastic
about participating in the CBW program, leaving the CmlC to design and