The US Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 28

population of New York City would be exposed to disease if one or more
pathogenic agents were disseminated covertly in several subway lines at a
period of peak traffic.” 97
Envisioned Use
The key question addressed by testing was: What military uses would be
served by the development of BW? In 1950 the Air Force presented a
plan for possible use of BW in a future general war that was divided into a
number of phases: In Phase I the Strategic Air Command would strike en-
emy targets with biological and atomic weapons. These combined strikes
would be continued throughout Phase II. From Phase III onward the BW
strikes would be “determined by the rate of increase in available aircraft,
availability of suitable targets, and the exigencies of the situation.” 98
A 1952 study by the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) ana-
lyzed attacks against military targets and attacks against cities. Military
targets were considered unpromising, since the enemy would probably
be prepared. Cities, however, were judged to be promising targets; their
populations were more vulnerable than soldiers. 99
How would the USSR use CBW against the US? An April 1955 report
to the National Security Council once more emphasized sabotage as a
likely means of attack. 100 Almost a year later, the NSC's estimate of the
situation envisioned several ways in which the Soviet Union might use
CBW “as secondary means of attack” in general nuclear war. The report
concluded by weighing the advantages to each side in a “total nuclear
war” in which unconventional weapons were used: “Initiation of BW
may be more to the advantage of NATO than to the USSR initially; how-
ever, to whose ultimate net advantage it could be is problematical.” If the
war were limited to Western Europe and remained nonnuclear, “Use of
chemical and biological weapons appears to offer NATO a means of de-
stroying large enemy forces without resorting to the use of nuclears;
however these weapons are no substitute for conventional forces.” 101 If a
limited war took place outside Europe, “Chemical and biological [ sic ]
could contribute extremely effective fire power, in addition to that of
conventional weapons against masses of Soviet Bloc manpower ...Ina
'brush fire' war...incapacitating (non-lethal) chemical and biological