Analysis and Implications - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 372

ing to devise a system from scratch, but building on a great deal of rele-
vant experience. The VEREX investigation by experts from BWC States
Parties, for example, concluded in part in 1993 that “potential verifi-
cation measures as identified and evaluated could be useful to varying
degrees in enhancing confidence, through increased transparency, that
States Parties were fulfilling their obligations under the BWC.” 10
Given the nature of some of the biodefense work carried out recently
by the US, the suspicion has arisen that perhaps the US has decided upon
a different policy—one that involves pushing at the boundaries in bio-
defense even at the risk of provoking increasing suspicions in other states.
The historical record of misperceptions of the nature of biowarfare/bio-
defense programs over the last century suggests that it may well result in
similar policies in other states and the initiation of precisely the action/re-
action process that occurred in the past. 11
A saner and safer policy would surely be to seek the greatest possible
transparency in all activities in the life sciences in academia, industry, and
government in all countries. Such transparency would help to diminish
the possibility of misplaced threat perceptions and could be achieved
without necessarily exposing crucial secrets—as has been demonstrated
in the CWC inspection processes. Even in the present situation there is a
clear-cut method by which this objective could be promoted, and that is
for the States Parties to the BWC to make much more use of the mecha-
nisms that already exist within the treaty regime. The CBMs agreed at the
Second and Third Review Conferences, for example, include Measure F,
“Declaration of Past Activities in Offensive and/or Defensive Biological
Research and Development Programs.” If States Parties were to use the
opportunity to provide comprehensive information in this document, a
great deal of suspicion might be reduced. For example, the US and the UK
declarations went along with the spirit of the requirement and attempted
to describe the whole of their offensive programs even though they
needed to report only from 1946 onward. Other countries such as Russia,
South Africa, and Iraq have yet to submit declarations of any adequacy
under this heading. Similarly, it would be possible to attempt to resolve
some, at least, of the past allegations if use were made of the opportuni-
ties provided for consultation and cooperation in Article V of the Conven-
tion itself. Yet in order achieve this end, much greater public and political