Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
years of the 21st century? At the end of World War II the resulting bipolar
power system and the new nuclear technology that had been shown to
work effectively brought nuclear weapons to the fore. We are clearly now
in a novel international security system in which the simple (nuclear) de-
terrence mechanisms of the past apply to a much lesser extent. In today's
uncertain world, where adversaries are not easily identified and the scope
and spread of the new biotechnology suggests that effective BW could be
widely held, there is a danger that these weapons could move to the fore-
front of military thinking. 4
A potential risk is surely the real (or misperceived as real) foundation
of a new series of state-level offensive BW programs. Real or imagined,
these programs might, as in the past, trigger an action/reaction process
that would elevate the real or perceived level of threat and promote the
further development of offensive BW programs. The net result would be
that the norm would at best stagnate or even erode in peacetime and per-
haps suffer irreparable damage in future conflicts.
A lesser problem at present is terrorism using BW. The weight of the
evidence suggests that at the moment capabilities for causing mass hu-
man casualties could come only from leakage of agents or knowledge
from state-level programs. Agricultural systems are more at risk today,
but, undoubtedly, capabilities for harming humans will increase as the
revolution in biology gathers pace, and this trend will require the devel-
opment of new policies on biosecurity at the national level.
Policies for the 21st Century
The obvious conclusion that follows from the preceding sections is that
the major objective of any policy designed to prevent the hostile use of
biological agents in future decades must be concentrated now on the
prevention of initiation and development of offensive BW programs by
states. The question therefore is: What policies would best achieve this?
Clearly, if any state (or substate organization) were actually to use biolog-
ical or toxin agents, it would be necessary for the international commu-
nity to react in the strongest possible manner in order to reestablish the
norm. If the regime fails, and a program is detected, or BW used, the re-
sponse must be swift and decisive. But while a clear international re-
sponse is necessary, it is far from sufficient on its own.
Search WWH ::




Custom Search