Analysis and Implications - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 357

ogy of BW was advancing from the cluster bomb and other such agent-
delivery systems envisaged at the end of World War II to aerosol-generat-
ing devices capable of enormously greater area effectiveness, comparable
to that of nuclear, even thermonuclear, weapons. Increasing reliance on
nuclear deterrence was thus removing the major incentive for states to
acquire BW as an element in ensuring their national security at just the
time that their potential utility for attacking large targets was becoming
apparent.
It was into this security environment in the mid-1960s that the UK in-
troduced its ideas for strengthening the 1925 Geneva Protocol in such a
way as to prohibit CBW altogether. It became clear that at least the US
was not then prepared to see CW included in such a disarmament treaty.
As BW, unlike CW, had not been used extensively in war and conse-
quently had not entered the mainstream of military doctrine and plan-
ning, there was less resistance to the idea that they should be totally
prohibited. There was also an appreciation that there would be security
benefits in the total prohibition of BW, as this would prevent the prolifer-
ation of weapons that had potential for effectiveness against large target
areas, as well as for clandestine use, and that were potentially accessible
to a much wider range of countries than could develop nuclear weapons.
The BWC was negotiated in 1969-1972 and opened for signature on 10
April 1972 in London, Moscow, and Washington, with the governments
of the UK, the USSR, and the US as co-depositaries (the Russian Federa-
tion taking over this responsibility from the Soviet Union in 1992). It en-
tered into force three years later, on 26 March 1975, with 46 original
parties. The treaty for the first time totally prohibited an entire class of
weapons.
Since the BWC
By 2005 the number of States Parties to the BWC had grown to 155 along
with 16 signatory states. In addition, some states, mindful of the “never
in any circumstances” provision of BWC Article I, had taken steps to lift
the reservations they had entered when joining the 1925 Geneva Proto-
col, whereby they retained the right to retaliate in kind against biological
(or chemical) attack. Although the US ratified the Geneva Protocol in
1975, it retains its reservation in regard to CW, and in December 2004 ab-