Legal Constraints on Biological Weapons - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 339

went far beyond, the mere prohibition of possession of nuclear, biologi-
cal, and chemical weapons. Industry was to be stringently regulated, con-
trolled, and inspected to ensure that no clandestine diversion from peace-
ful to military production occurred.
In sum, the effect of the peace treaties was to impose constraints on
Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Italy, and Romania that were of uncertain
application to BW; but the effect of the postwar settlements for Austria
and (West) Germany respectively was to impose a clear prohibition on
possession of (inter alia) BW, with in the former case a ban on “experi-
mentation” as well as possession and construction, and in the latter case a
prohibition on “manufacture” that left R&D formally unconstrained, but
with a unique Western European Union regime of international verificat-
ion introduced primarily to prevent any breach of this obligation through
clandestine diversion from industry. 5
As of 10 April 1972 the 85 original signatories to the BWC—joined by
14 more over the next three months—were under a signatory obligation
to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Con-
vention. Just which acts would cross the line was never defined, but it
was only on 26 March 1975 with entry into force that the legal con-
straints on possession of BW and associated activities came fully into ef-
fect, initially for the 46 original parties and now for 154 States Parties to
the BWC.
In France and the UK, national penal legislation had made a wide
range of BWC-prohibited activities related to BW possession illegal and
subject to criminal prosecution and penalties: in France from 9 June 1972
(by Law No. 72-467) and in the UK from 8 February 1974 (by the BW Act
1974). These laws came fully into effect immediately, and would have re-
mained fully in effect even if the BWC had not entered into force, be-
cause in legal status they were wholly independent of the Convention. In
the case of the UK the legislation was intended to enable the UK to ratify
the Convention secure in the knowledge that it was already in a position
to give domestic legal effect to the obligations it would be assuming upon
the entry into force of the Convention. In the case of France, which had
political objections to the BWC that would delay its accession until 1984,
the legislation was all the more independent of the BWC, because in
1972 it appeared likely to be a permanent substitute for it.