The Politics of Biological Disarmament - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 327

pean groups, including South Africa, Brazil, Peru, Poland, and Croatia.
Nevertheless, in July 2001 the US rejected the composite text and sought
to end the mandate of the AHG. The US delegation offered a number of
alternative measures, including stronger national penal legislation, better
domestic control of pathogens, improved ability of the UN secretary gen-
eral to investigate alleged use of BW or suspicious disease outbreaks,
stricter biosafety standards, and better disease surveillance. There was no
proposal to deal with suspected state programs of development and pro-
duction of BW. 74
The Fifth Review Conference began only a few months after US rejec-
tion of the fruits of the AHG negotiations. The conference averted the di-
sastrous outcome of no final agreement only by taking the highly un-
usual step of suspending deliberations for a year. The suspension was
called when the US insisted on termination of the mandate of the AHG in
the face of fierce opposition. When the Review Conference resumed in
November 2002, it agreed to yearly expert and political meetings on spe-
cific topics, with no mention of the AHG or its mandate, the US having
backed away from its 2001 demand. 75 Thus, a 10-year international effort
to address the weaknesses of the treaty has ground to an uncertain halt.
While the Convention parties meet and debate the merits of the US pro-
posals, the fate of the AHG and its mandate remain in limbo until the
Sixth Review Conference, in 2006. The mandate remains in existence,
with no action scheduled to fulfill its requirements.
Conclusion
Almost from start to finish the discussions of a ban on the development
and production of BW within the governments most important to prog-
ress in the negotiations were affected by other, higher priorities. Those
priorities included nuclear and CW policy, the use of chemical agents by
the US in Vietnam, and the obligations and interpretations of the Geneva
Protocol.
The UK initiated a propaganda exercise despite internal opposition,
particularly within the MOD. The MOD did not press its concerns, be-
cause it did not think that the UK BW initiative would meet with sub-
stantive success. Meanwhile, US willingness to accept a BW Convention
stripped of all but minimal attention to verification issues seemed to ema-