The Politics of Biological Disarmament - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 326

USSR would be the subject of the first complaint to be brought before
the committee, and few states were happy to contemplate the political
furor that would ensue, and the attendant threat to the BWC's continua-
tion . . . [so it] paradoxically strengthened the position of the USSR. 71
At the Second Review Conference, in 1986, delegations sought to
strengthen the Convention through politically binding declarations of
relevant activities, often referred to as confidence-building measures
(CBMs). The 1986 CBMs were augmented with additional declaration
obligations at the Third Review Conference, in 1991. Yet as early as 1991,
states' compliance with even these minimal obligations proved disap-
pointing. 72
The Third Review Conference authorized the formation of a commit-
tee of experts, known as VEREX, to examine the technical feasibility of
verification measures. After examining many on-site measures the ex-
perts concluded that some would make the treaty a more effective instru-
ment. 73 At a 1994 Special Conference to discuss the VEREX findings, the
States Parties created a mandate for an Ad Hoc Group (AHG) to draft pro-
posals for a legally binding protocol to strengthen the effectiveness and
improve the implementation of the Convention.
By April 2001, as a result of deliberations from January 1995 through
February 2001, the AHG had produced a lengthy negotiating text. How-
ever, many substantive issues remained unresolved, as compromises
were required that normally are not made until the diplomatic endgame.
To provoke entry into that phase of negotiations, the group's chair-
man, Ambassador Tibor Tóth of Hungary, presented a “composite text” in
which all outstanding issues were resolved in ways that he considered
might be acceptable to all the drafting nations. The principal elements of
the composite text protocol to strengthen the BWC would have required
declaration of relevant facilities, established an organization to observe
activities at declared facilities, and allowed States Parties to call for on-site
investigations of alleged violations of the treaty. The protocol would have
facilitated international cooperation in the peaceful uses of biology and
biotechnology while monitoring transfers of biological agents, toxins, and
relevant equipment.
The text garnered a groundswell of support from European countries,
Canada, Australia, and key members of the nonaligned and eastern Euro-