The Politics of Biological Disarmament - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 323

the prohibited weapons,” which could quickly and easily be turned into
weapons. 63
A third substantive criticism of the Soviet draft was that the Soviet
method of consultation and cooperation to solve problems of implemen-
tation—which ultimately found its way into the BWC—was not a “realis-
tic proposal to deter would-be violators.” The UK document summed up
its criticisms of the consultation and cooperation provisions of the Soviet
draft in this way: “Consultation and cooperation may be all that is re-
quired in some arms control measures, e.g. on the sea bed, where States
are free to observe other States' activities. But more than this is required
when it is a question of a State's activities within its national territo-
ries.” 64 The complaints procedure and the security assurances in the UK
draft provided a more powerful deterrent.
Several states responded negatively to the attempt in the new Soviet
Draft Convention to conform with the UK and US desires to separate
chemical and biological weapons. Sweden, Mexico, Morocco, and others
expressed both dismay, and doubt that effective controls on CW would
now ever be achieved. The neutral and nonaligned countries, however,
recognized that critical momentum was behind the initiative as soon as
the Soviet Union and its allies tabled a Draft Convention similar to the UK
draft supported by the US.
Following consultations with its allies in April (mere weeks after the
new Soviet Draft Convention was tabled), the US decided to negotiate on
the basis of the Soviet text. A National Security memorandum prepared
for President Nixon focused on a few issues. First, the US planned to
“firmly reject...theUSSR's view that the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohib-
its the use of tear gas and herbicides in war.” Second, the US proposed
that the differences between the UK and Soviet drafts concerning the use
of BW be handled by a preambular paragraph rather than by an operative
provision as in the UK draft: “since a prohibition of possession or produc-
tion of these weapons would accomplish the purpose of prohibiting use,
an operative provision banning use is not considered necessary.” Third,
without an operative clause specifically banning use, the complaints pro-
cedure advocated by the UK for the secretary general to investigate alle-
gations of use did not warrant any mention. However, the memorandum
discussed the advantages to the US of the absence of on-site verification
measures in both drafts: “Because on-site verification could not possibly