The Politics of Biological Disarmament - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 322

matic options. In addition, because of the technical nature of the topic,
nongovernmental scientific experts provided advice. Despite opposition
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who favored retention of an offensive pro-
gram, the secretary of defense joined the other civilian principals in rec-
ommending unilateral renunciation of BW. 59 Tucker concluded that both
military and political considerations influenced Nixon's decision. Mili-
tarily the weapons “had limited tactical utility...anddidnotconstitute a
reliable and effective strategic deterrent.” Politically, the weapons had no
powerful constituencies, it was important to discourage other countries
from acquiring BW, and by renouncing them Nixon could deflect criti-
cism about the use of chemicals in Vietnam. 60
Following the US unilateral renunciation of BW in November 1969
and of toxins in February 1970, little progress was made on BW arms
control. Efforts at the CCD were concentrated on convincing other dele-
gations of the advisability of separating negotiations on the control of CW
and BW. 61 Then, on 30 March 1971 the Soviet Union unexpectedly tabled
a second Draft Convention at the CCD, dropping its long-standing oppo-
sition to separating CW and BW.
The new Soviet draft, tabled on behalf of nine Warsaw Pact states, dif-
fered from the UK draft in several crucial respects. First, it ignored Article
I of the UK draft, which obligated parties never, in any circumstances,
to use biological methods of warfare. Second, it omitted the UK draft's
prohibition of research aimed at offensive production. Third, it required
all complaints concerning a breach of obligations to go to the Security
Council.
The Soviet draft included a few features absent from the UK draft. It re-
quired states to undertake legislative and administrative measures for
prohibiting BW. It also created an obligation for states to facilitate the ex-
change of equipment, materials, and information for the use of biological
agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. 62
An internal UK document raised a number of concerns about the dif-
ferences between the UK and Soviet Draft Conventions. One was that
since the Soviet draft did not specifically outlaw use, the USSR might
wish to retain the right to retaliate with BW. Another was that since the
Soviet draft prohibited the production of “weapons” whereas the UK
draft prohibited “methods of warfare,” “the Soviet formulation would
leave them free to manufacture, stockpile, etc. the component parts of