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weapons. Because the Soviet draft combined CW and BW, excluded an
explicit prohibition against use, and had been tabled at the UN General
Assembly instead of at the CCD in Geneva, the “accepted forum for disar-
mament negotiations,” the UK viewed the Soviet initiative as “a propa-
ganda gesture.”
56
A few days after the Soviet Union introduced the Draft Conven-
tion, a confidential telegram described a luncheon conversation between
Roland Timerbaev, of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Alan
Neidle, of the US delegation to the CCD in Geneva, on the topic of the re-
cently tabled Soviet Draft Convention. Neidle expressed the opinion that
the Soviet Draft Convention “looked like [a] superficial product not de-
signed to promote serious negotiations.” Timerbaev's response, however,
indicated that the Draft Convention was not strictly a propaganda ploy.
Timerbaev reportedly had preferred tabling the draft in Geneva; more-
over, he had emphasized that the draft “may be viewed as bridge be-
tween propaganda of past and serious willingness to discuss actual arms
control.” The Soviets were willing to discuss limitations on development
and production of CBW, Timerbaev said, but the Soviet government had
to “go through certain procedures...which might have a propaganda
appearance.” The US delegation in Geneva was inclined to believe Timer-
baev because of the “long history of Sovs entering into arms control ne-
gotiations (NPT, LTBT) via portal of odoriferous propaganda initiatives.”
The account of the conversation also emphasized the benefits of US rati-
fication of the Geneva Protocol. Timerbaev stated that the Soviet Draft
Convention was not a take-it-or-leave-it proposition and that “it would
be necessary to give serious consideration to UK suggestions regarding
complaints procedure.”
57
Less than two months later the US announced its decisions to unilater-
ally abandon its offensive BW program, to destroy its BW stocks, to place
a moratorium on CW production, and to submit the 1925 Geneva Proto-
col to the US Senate for ratification. The internal government discussions
leading to the US decision to unilaterally give up its offensive BW pro-
gram have already been recounted in detail by Jonathan Tucker (see also
Chapter 2).
58
In brief, early in the Nixon administration National Secu-
rity Advisor Henry Kissinger launched an in-depth interagency review
of CBW policies. Three interdepartmental groups conducted analytical
work: one from the intelligence community to assess foreign capabilities
in BW, a second to examine military options, and a third to explore diplo-
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