The Politics of Biological Disarmament - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 320

noted that the Soviets had expressed reservations about the verification
aspects of the UK draft, particularly the role of the UN secretary general
in investigating alleged use. The CIA report noted that the Soviets histori-
cally strove to “limit the powers of that office,” preferring arrangements
to go through the Security Council, presumably because of its veto power
in that body. The report concluded that “the UK initiative on BW in the
ENDC will probably founder, whatever its merits,” because “the Soviets
and their allies seem intent upon avoiding substantive consideration of it
in Geneva in favor of taking the problem to the [General] Assembly” in
New York, where the US expected the discussion to focus on US use of
tear gas in Vietnam. 54
In November 1969 a report to the US National Security Council out-
lined the advantages and disadvantages of what were seen as the impor-
tant BW policy issues. 55 The primary issue was whether or not the US
should support the UK draft treaty that had been tabled that year: Should
the US restrict its BW programs to research, development, training, and
education, or should it maintain and develop stockpiles of lethal, incapac-
itating, or anticrop agents? The report considered the pros and cons of
lethal and incapacitating agents separately, but it omitted detailed discus-
sion of anticrop agents. It did not consider restricting programs to re-
search only. Nor did it reach any recommendations, instead only listing
the advantages and disadvantages of each policy option. Nevertheless,
the analysis reveals some of the thinking behind the ultimate US support
for the UK Draft Convention. One major advantage was that it would be
in the US interest to have other countries forgo a BW capability once the
US had decided to do so. In addition, the provisions in the UK draft for
“investigations of allegations of violations...provide some measure of
security.” Because the UK draft had some merit in inhibiting other states,
in regard to security the US would be no worse off, and might be better
off. The list of disadvantages centered on the effects of accepting an un-
verifiable treaty provision in other arms control contexts.
The Soviet Draft Conventions of September 1969 and
March 1971
In September 1969 the Soviet Union tabled a Draft Convention prohib-
iting the development and production of both chemical and biological