The Politics of Biological Disarmament - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 319

My hope is that the General Assembly will be prepared to adopt the
Convention without knowing exactly what the investigating machinery
would consist of; that the Secretary-General, in accordance with the Se-
curity Council Resolution, would thereafter establish a working group of
some kind to consider the form of the investigating body; that he would
then make appropriate recommendations; and that when these were ap-
proved a sufficient number of states would ratify the Convention to
bring it into force. 51
The UK did not seem particularly optimistic about the chances of success
for its Draft Convention. The UK delegation in Geneva noted that al-
though they had pointed out to the Russians that “the real danger comes
from medium and small powers...this is not one we can press too hard.”
The nonaligned countries were not enthusiastic about a draft BW con-
vention because of “their feeling that we are trying to divert attention
from nuclear disarmament.” The delegation concluded that “we are un-
likely to win enough support from the non-aligned even to discomfort
the Americans and Russians.” 52
US Policy Considerations
A top-secret memorandum of conversation between US Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) officials and the counselor at the Ca-
nadian embassy in 1967 hinted at US interest in CBW disarmament.
CBW was a concern of the US because of possible proliferation to non-
nuclear countries, which might find the CBW alternatives to nuclear
weapons “cheaper and easier.” 53 In August 1969 the CIA issued an intel-
ligence report, “Disarmament: Chemical-Biological Warfare Controls and
Prospects for Improvement.” The report noted once again that CBW had
taken a backseat to other arms control initiatives, this time to nuclear
weapons and the seabeds. It contained an assessment of the UK BW draft
treaty, noting that “deference to the US no doubt played a part in Brit-
ain's decision not to treat CW in its initiative, since debate on the tear gas
issue...ispotentially embarrassing to the US.” Indeed, the separation of
CW and BW in the Draft Convention, Soviet and other delegations' reac-
tions to the UK draft, and complications surrounding US use of tear gas
in Vietnam warranted considerable discussion in the report. The report