The Politics of Biological Disarmament - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 318

ing articles included provisions for amendment, signature, ratification,
entry into force, unlimited duration, and withdrawal.
Article III, which described two routes for complaints of noncompli-
ance—one with the secretary general, the other with the Security Coun-
cil—generated considerable internal debate. In reference to the Security
Council's investigation of allegations of development or production: “the
Ministry of Defense would have liked to omit altogether the phrase 'and
request that the complaint be investigated'...onthegrounds that no ad-
equate means existed for investigating such complaints and that to in-
cluded provision for such 'investigation' might be both misleading and
detrimental to our own interests.” Nevertheless, the Disarmament De-
partment prevailed with its argument: “We contended that cases might
well arise in which it was possible to investigate complaints that biologi-
cal agents were being produced or stockpiled for hostile purposes...and
that parties must be given the right to request that their complaints be in-
vestigated, even though the Security Council might not accede to the re-
quest. Otherwise the whole Convention would be gravely weakened.” 49
The UK delegation at the ENDC in Geneva, commenting on the same ar-
ticle, noted that “even if we are not prepared to admit it, there would
be little similarity in the procedure and prospects of success in the two
cases.” 50 Bifurcating the investigating procedures for complaints about
the use of BW and about complaints of illicit development and produc-
tion would have great significance as the UK Draft Convention was trans-
formed through negotiations.
The ENDC delegation was also anxious to have the investigating ma-
chinery described in greater detail than in either the Draft Convention or
the accompanying draft Security Council resolution. The Disarmament
Department believed that it was premature to make a proposal on the
composition of the investigating body. Although the ENDC delegation
favored an international committee, the Disarmament Department had
doubts about the “ability of such a committee to tackle the job with the
necessary cohesion, efficiency and speed.” The Disarmament Department
described what it hoped would happen regarding investigating machin-
ery for complaints:
many states are likely to want to know what the investigating machin-
ery is before they sign, or at any rate before they ratify, the Convention.