The Politics of Biological Disarmament - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 308

ciated with CBW. While both the US and the UK recognized the need to
make progress in this area, at the end of January 1964 one UK official
characterized it as “a matter on which there is no particular urgency.” 13
The Americans repeatedly indicated that they wished to delay discussions
of CBW issues until their studies were completed. In late September 1964
the UK embassy queried Washington officials on the status of the CBW
studies. Washington officials told their UK colleagues that “the American
studies were continuing, but were going slowly. For one thing, other
matters had to be given priority.” 14 The UK generally agreed that awaiting
the conclusions of the studies was appropriate, but eventually the British
began to display some impatience with the Americans.
In mid-1964 an official from the UK Foreign Office candidly admitted
that “the primary purpose of a proposal for an agreement prohibiting the
use of CBW would be to embarrass the Russians at Geneva. The West
would try to expose Russian preparations in this field as far as would be
compatible with security considerations. We would not be trying to force
a change in Russian military doctrine . . . Our objective would, in short,
be propagandistic rather than substantive.” Problems with verification
measures of a ban on CBW were clearly recognized as well:
effective verification of a prohibition agreement may not be possible.
This is because CW and BW agents have their source in toxicological re-
search, in medicine, veterinary medicine and agriculture. Even if the fa-
cilities engaged in these activities in the U.K. could be listed and made
available for inspection, it is not really conceivable that the Russians
would be prepared to do the same. A proposal for an agreement that in-
cluded provisions for verification would probably be too easily recog-
nized as a propaganda move, leaving the alternative of an agreement
without verification provisions.
The Foreign Office also outlined the argument for an agreement without
verification provisions: “since there would be no dismantling of existing
preparations or defenses, no harm to national security would result from
the absence of verification arrangements.” 15
During 1964 the UK also began to consider separating BW from CW.
The Ministry of Defence (MOD) argued that there was a case for distin-
guishing between the two on the basis of their tactical and strategic differ-
ences. “Potentially, given the appropriate delivery system, BW has the