Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
quarters building in Koto Ward, Tokyo. Joyu, who led the headquarters
at the time, supervised the operation. There were scores of complaints
from local residents about foul odors, and Asahara convened a press con-
ference near the building to explain that the odors were generated during
the group's religious rituals. However, the complaints became so numer-
ous, and the police attention so troubling, that the Aum ceased the spray-
ing, removed all equipment from the building, and vacated the site.
For dissemination in this operation, the Aum set up two sprayers on
the roof of the eight-story building, each within a large round cooling
tower. Pipes were extended from the cooling tower to tanks below, filled
with a liquid suspension of
B. anthracis.
The device worked poorly, pro-
ducing large droplets rather than the very fine aerosol needed for ef-
fective transmission of anthrax. It also appears that the spore concentra-
tion was very low; much later analysis of a sample of liquid, retained by
local authorities after their investigation of the odor complaints, detected
fewer than 10
4
viable
B. anthracis
per milliliter,
26
a concentration at least
five orders of magnitude below that necessary for a highly infectious wet
aerosol. The apparatus was also reported to have leaked badly. Clearly,
however, this was a major operation, which required a large volume of
agent (probably thousands of liters) and was presumably intended to
cause huge numbers of casualties. Even with the low quality of prepara-
tion and the crude aerosol, it is likely that many cases of cutaneous an-
thrax would have resulted had the strain been virulent.
After the failed operation in Kameido, the Aum continued production
of
B. anthracis
at the Kamiku-isshiki compound. In the summer of 1993
the group tried to disseminate
B. anthracis
around the Kanagawa prefec-
tural office and the Imperial Palace from vehicles equipped with spraying
devices. According to prosecutors' statements, the nozzle of the sprayer
clogged, and the operation failed.
27
This failure, and the failure of the
spray device at the Tokyo headquarters, indicate that the Aum failed to
develop workable agent formulations and dissemination devices, in addi-
tion to failing to obtain virulent agents.
Asahara and his followers had little expertise, and all their BW efforts
failed. With CW it was different; the Aum had limited success in dissemi-
nating sarin in Matsumoto and Tokyo.
28
It was the Tokyo subway at-
tacks with sarin that led to the group's demise. Several days after the To-
kyo sarin attacks, 2,500 police raided Aum facilities and arrested more
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