Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
CHAPTER
14
Terrorist Use of
Biological Weapons
MARK WHEELIS
MASAAKI SUGISHIMA
Biological weapons (BW) might be attractive not only to
states, but to criminals and to terrorists as well. The history of terrorist use
of BW is, like the history of state use, scant, presumably because of the
high degree of expertise required and the difficulty of obtaining necessary
materials. However, these barriers may be diminishing as widespread dis-
cussion of the threat of bioterrorism makes the requisites explicit. Thus it
would be a mistake to assume that the sparse record of bioterrorism to
date accurately predicts the future.
There is no generally agreed definition of bioterrorism, or even of ter-
rorism. Here we consider bioterrorism to have four key elements: (1) the
deliberate use, or the threat of use, of biological agents or toxins (2) by in-
dividuals or groups (but not states) (3) against nonmilitary targets (such
as civilians or agricultural targets) (4) to achieve a political, ideological, or
religious goal. The intent may be to cause disease, fear of disease, or both.
The use of BW for entirely nonpolitical goals (such as revenge or profit)
is not considered bioterrorism, but rather biocriminality. The extensive
history of the use of toxins for criminal purposes is beyond the scope of
this chapter.
1
There have been only two confirmed attempts to use BW for terrorist
purposes targeting humans: the 1984 use of
Salmonella
by the Rajneesh
cult in Oregon, and the 1990-1995 attempted use of anthrax and botuli-
num toxin by the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Tokyo. A third incident, the al-
leged use of a variety of infectious diseases against Native Americans in
the Amazon basin during the 1950s and 1960s, is probable but not yet
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