Allegations of Biological Weapons Use - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 257

political barriers that make the alleged full-scale BW campaign impossible
do not necessarily apply to limited BW field tests. Sufficient munitions
were available, and pilot plant production could have provided sufficient
agent. Clandestine operations and plausible deniability could have al-
lowed freedom from the policy restrictions that applied to the mainline
US BW program.
If any such trials occurred, they would have been conducted by the
Special Operations Division (SOD) of the US Army Biological Laboratory
at Camp Detrick, which collaborated with the CIA to develop biological
weapons for sabotage and clandestine use. 41 Most documents describ-
ing the projects of the SOD remain classified, and accounts of its activi-
ties have been redacted from official histories of the US BW program.
Congressional investigations determined that clandestine BW use could
not be excluded, because the CIA had destroyed the pertinent records. 42
Since the documentary evidence remains unavailable, evidence of US
BW field trials must be sought in the available scientific data regarding
the allegations.
The International Scientific Commission Report
The most important document detailing the scientific investigation of
the allegations is the report of the International Scientific Commission
(ISC). 43 This group consisted of sympathetic Western scientists, assem-
bled by China after it rejected Western proposals that the World Health
Organization or International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) inves-
tigate. 44 The ISC compiled the scientific data that had been gathered by
the Chinese scientists in March and April 1952, but it did no field or labo-
ratory work itself, nor did it witness any BW attacks. It collected testi-
mony and scientific reports in China and North Korea from 22 June to 6
August 1952, completing a report on 31 August that was published on 1
October 1952. The report contained over 665 pages of text and 100 pages
of photographs. The report proper ran to 61 pages, with the remainder
consisting of 48 scientific appendices.
The ISC report detailed 37 incidents in China and 13 in North Korea
that were alleged to be biological attacks. The North Korean and Chinese
portions differed significantly. In North Korea, Chinese scientific teams
relied heavily on North Korean officials and on Soviet-advised North Ko-