The US Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 12

Given the inherent difficulties of the task, it is not surprising that
American CBW policy remained unchanged throughout the 1940s and
early 1950s. The issue was reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS),
who recommended that the policy of retaliation be continued as “an in-
terim measure...subjected to review after detailed operational evalua-
tions of chemical warfare, biological warfare, and radiological warfare
have been made.” 13
The interim policy was challenged five days after the outbreak of the
Korean War. On 30 June 1950 the Stevenson Committee, chaired by Earl
P. Stevenson, urged major emphasis on BW preparedness along with a
change in chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) policy, a recom-
mendation rejected by Secretary of Defense George Marshall in October
1950. 14
During the Korean War (1950-1953) the Communists alleged that the
US was using CBW against North Korea and Communist China. Ameri-
can officials feared that the Communist powers were charging the US
with germ warfare to justify their intended use of BW. The war brought
urgency to the need for speeding up the CBW program and attention to
the possible need to revise policy, but no revision was achieved during
the Truman administration. 15 In 1956, however, during the Eisenhower
administration, a policy change was enunciated by the National Security
Council (NSC): “To the extent that the military effectiveness of the armed
forces will be enhanced by their use, the United States will be prepared to
use chemical and bacteriological weapons in general war. The decision as
to their use will be made by the President.” Time and circumstance per-
mitting, the US would consult its allies before initiating CBW. 16
An earlier discussion in the NSC revealed the extent of the shift. Dr. Ar-
thur S. Flemming, director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, raised
the issue:
Dr. Flemming said he wished to raise the question with respect to para-
graph 12, regarding chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons
in general war. He asked whether he was correct in believing that our
previous policy had been that we would have recourse to such weapons
only in retaliation against their use by an enemy. Did the language of
paragraph 12 thus amount to a change in policy in respecting the use of
such weapons? The President commented that the chief purpose of para-