Midspectrum Incapacitant Programs - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 243

that T3456 (LSD) was not a practical agent because “there were prob-
lems of dissemination, the 100% effective dose by inhalation was rela-
tively high, and the material was expensive.” 87 The CDAB heard that a
third field experiment with LSD had been satisfactory, but that “work on
TL2636 (the oripavine derivative) was of academic interest only.” 88
Despite such setbacks, a joint meeting of the Applied Biology Commit-
tee and the Biology Committee in late 1968 took the form of an extended
seminar on “Behavioural Studies.” 89 Work was clearly pressing ahead
on glycollates. 90 Yet in a paper for the Offensive Evaluation Committee,
Fisher stated: “On general grounds I think it unlikely that...apure
incapacitator agent will emerge. Any chemical agent, a small dose of
which is capable of profound disturbance of bodily or mental function, is
certain to be able to cause death in large dose . . . and no attack with a
chemical warfare agent is likely to be designed with the primary objective
of avoiding overhitting.” 91 Nevertheless, work on these agents clearly
continued at least into the early 1970s in the UK. 92
The US Psychochemical Weapons Program
The entirety of the huge US effort during the Cold War to investigate
nonlethal psychochemicals is beyond the scope of this chapter. However,
the development and eventual weaponization of the agent BZ is of partic-
ular interest.
The US program to develop psychochemical weapons for orthodox
military purposes can be dated to a 1949 US Army Chemical Corps
(CmlC) report suggesting that psychochemicals might replace WMD. It
proposed three groups of candidate agents: LSD and its congeners, THC,
and phenethylamines. Its inspiration may well have been the efforts to
use psychoactive agents in interrogation of prisoners, notably the Allied
discovery of Nazi studies using mescaline. This interest in manipulating
individuals with psychoactive agents for interrogation was enthusiasti-
cally embraced by the CIA, and engendered the MK Ultra and MK
Niaomi mind-control projects. The CIA and Army programs investigated
the same agents, often in the same institutions. Because nearly all of the
CIA documentation was destroyed in 1973, and because much of the mil-
itary documentation remains classified or is otherwise unavailable, it is