Antianimal Biological Weapons Programs - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 228

such activities were pursued after the US unilaterally rejected all BW in
1969.
The UK Program
The UK's Biological Research Advisory Board (BRAB) was founded in
1946 (see Chapter 3). In its initial meeting it recommended that future
research should include “information on sabotage methods calculated to
initiate at least certain animal diseases in epizootic form.” During this pe-
riod the focus of antianimal activities in the UK shifted from anthrax
(agent of choice in the World War II program) to FMD . By 1951 the
BRAB had established that FMD represented a considerable technical
challenge. In order to confront such challenges, the UK BW organization
became interested in the research capabilities of the Pirbright Veterinary
Laboratory (since renamed the Institute of Animal Health, Pirbright).
It expressed interest in closer ties between the Ministry of Agriculture
and BW-related institutions and in a closer relationship between Porton
Down and the Veterinary Research Laboratories (primarily the Pirbright
Veterinary Laboratory and its sister facility at Weybridge, in Surrey). 10
It is unclear whether this initial interest was related to offensive or de-
fensive goals. In any event, by 1952 offensive research on FMD was being
carried out at Pirbright, and certain parties considered this to be the pri-
mary function of the veterinary facility. The closer relationship between
the BRAB and the veterinary laboratories continued into 1953, for at
least one senior figure from Pirbright was present at a transatlantic meet-
ing on 19 September. 11
A report from the BRAB in 1955 outlined what the UK saw as desirable
in antianimal BW:
To be effective in an active war, BW attacks would need to cause very
great losses in a short time and over large areas. They would need to af-
fect crops or livestock which were essential to the war effort of the coun-
try attacked and that on a scale to impair fighting capacity either directly
or through civilian production ability. Further, they would need to be of
such a nature that the country attacked could not effectively combat
them by established means readily available. 12