Anticrop Biological Weapons Programs - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 220

testing of anticrop BW existed from the beginning of the 1970s in
Kazakhstan. According to Ken Alibek, a notable characteristic of the anti-
agricultural capability was that, in contrast with the USSR's offensive
antipersonnel BW capability, antiagricultural weapons were never pro-
duced on a regular basis and were not stockpiled. 31 Rather, the USSR
maintained a number of mobilization facilities with rapid-production ca-
pacities that could be called upon to produce such agents on demand. In
this regard, the Soviet program differed significantly from the US pro-
gram, which accumulated large stockpiles of anticrop agents, and which
gave substantial attention to improving their storage life.
Weapons for the delivery of the USSR's tactical and offensive biological
warfare capability ranged from medium-range bombers fitted with spray
tanks and cluster bombs, to ballistic missiles, and even cruise missiles. 32
Iraq
The origins and institutional infrastructure of Iraq's offensive BW pro-
gram have been well documented in the open literature, and in official
documentation arising from the investigations conducted by the United
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) on Iraq. By the early 1990s Iraq
had progressed to weaponization and emergency deployment of anti-
personnel BW (see Chapter 8).
The 1995 UNSCOM report noted that within its overall BW R&D pro-
gram Iraq had a component related to anticrop warfare. Details of this
component remain extremely limited. However, it appears that Iraq had
conducted research into the crop-destructive capabilities of a fungal plant
pathogen that is the causal agent of the plant disease variously called
cover smut, stinking smut, or bunt of wheat. It is thought that weapon-
ization of this agent progressed only to a limited extent, but it is under-
stood that a reasonably mature program of testing had developed by the
end of the 1980s. According to UNSCOM, “After small production at Al
Salman, larger-scale production was carried out near Mosul in 1987 and
1988 and considerable quantities of contaminated grain were harvested.
The idea was said not to have been further developed; however, it was
only sometime in 1990 that the contaminated grain was destroyed by
burning at the Fudaliyah site.” 33
Information relating to the intended target for this type of weapon also