Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
and chemical warfare programs in the postwar period was the six-part se-
ries published by SIPRI in the 1970s, which contained valuable insights
into the nature and scope of such programs. 2 Further information has
been made available with the recent publication of a number of topics
and articles, including a more comprehensive account of anticrop biologi-
cal warfare based on a broad but incomplete set of primary sources. 3 Al-
though this subject was not dealt with separately in the SIPRI publication
Biological and Toxin Weapons Research, Development and Use from the Middle
Ages to 1945, 4 it is clear that anticrop biological warfare programs were
pursued by a number of nations, notably the US and the UK, both of
which emerged from the war with active BW development programs.
In the absence of legal constraints, offensive anticrop BW R&D in the
US was pursued in earnest between 1945 and Nixon's announcement in
1969 that the US was unilaterally ceasing its offensive program. (For a
general account of the US BW program, see Chapter 2.)
Several newly declassified primary sources provide new insight into US
R&D activities in this period in collaboration with the UK.
UK and US Collaboration
British and American collaboration on problems relating to chemical
warfare can be traced back to World War I, when, according to Gradon
Carter and Graham Pearson, “Anglo-American liaison underpinned the
US Chemical Warfare Service created in 1918.” Although collaboration
established clear channels of communication between the UK and the
US, informal collaboration and information exchange on matters relating
to anticrop biological and chemical warfare took place in the early days of
World War II. The process of tripartite collaboration including Canada
was formalized in 1947, with the number of participating countries ex-
panding in 1964 to include Australia, and the quadripartite arrangement
being again formalized on matters relating to chemical and biological de-
fense under the 1980 memorandum of understanding. 5
Political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic appear to have been inti-
mately aware of the particulars of R&D concerning an offensive anti-
crop warfare capability, and that R&D into both biological and chemical
agents were closely bound up. Churchill had considered the possible use
of chemical agents against German agricultural targets in 1942. Discov-
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