The South African Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 195

civilian minister of defense. Many members of the Defence Force felt
threatened by the changes, and it is unlikely that De Klerk would have
been told about the more sinister aspects of the CBW program, particu-
larly since the development of BW assassination weapons, which were
part of it, put South Africa in violation of its commitments under the Bio-
logical Weapons Convention (BWC).
De Klerk's 1990 briefing paper referred to the BW program in two
short and vague paragraphs, stating in part: “It is not possible to describe
the current biological threat to the world because of the speedy develop-
ment of techniques to produce new bacteria as well as other organisms.
Our biological capacity is focused on staying up to date with the changing
threat. To do this we are constantly producing new organisms in order to
develop a preventative capacity as well as treatment.” 15
On the objectives of the CBW program, the briefing was also obscure:
“The aim of Project Coast is that of covert research and development of
CBW and the establishment of production technology in the sensitive
and critical areas of chemical and biological warfare to provide the South
African security forces with a CBW capacity following the CBW philoso-
phy and strategy.” Neither the so-called CBW philosophy nor the strategy
was explained. With regard to BW the objective of Project Coast was to
“establish a research, production and development capacity with regard
to biological warfare.” 16 The vague language of the documents describing
Project Coast was undoubtedly intended to ensure plausible deniability if
the documents ever became public.
In 1990 Basson presented a document to the Reduced Defence Com-
mand Council, outlining the proposed philosophy with regard to chemi-
cal warfare; no corresponding document on biological warfare has been
made public. It is far from clear whether a philosophy was ever outlined
on biological warfare, and it is unlikely that a document describing it ex-
ists. Basson provided some insight into a possible reason for this silence,
noting: “This philosophy does not cover any aspects of Biological warfare.
Because of the more controlled nature of Biological Warfare there are
many more international control measures. The production of Biological
weapons is not allowed anywhere in the world.” 17 This account suggests
that because of the ban on BW, the policy remained unwritten. This of-
ficial silence is consistent with the way in which the South African secu-
rity forces operated under apartheid. The TRC, for example, found very