Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
destroyed, there would be little trace of the program left. Successful con-
cealment of the BW program could have been seen by Iraq as simplifying
and shortening the inspection process—something that could not have
been done for CW or for missiles. There are also indications that Iraq
monitored UNSCOM and UNMOVIC activities and utilized these observa-
tions to further conceal its program, perhaps by using mobile facilities
and a network of laboratories.
What is clear from the Iraq experience is the importance of achieving
universal participation in the BWC, and of strengthening the norm em-
bodied in that Convention through enhancing its effectiveness and im-
proving its implementation. As David Kay has said, an “international in-
spection regime is even more important now than it ever was. If there
is effective inspection, then the need for unilateral preemptive action
becomes much less critical.” 21 It is also evident from the experience of
UNSCOM and UNMOVIC in Iraq that the ongoing monitoring and veri-
fication program for biological materials and equipment was effective, as
were the analogous programs for chemicals and missiles. In other words,
the Iraq experience provides no evidence that BW capabilities could not
be effectively monitored by a regime like that used for CW.
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