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conducted in May 1990. UNMOVIC has evidence that dynamic firings of
such rockets containing botulinum toxin, anthrax simulant, and aflatoxin
took place at some time in 1990. UNMOVIC has not been able to identify
any other BW activity that might have constituted a specific response to
the presidential statement. The ISG states that following the president's
statement, the BW program was ordered to go all out for weaponization.
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 also accelerated and
changed the direction of its WMD programs. The emphasis was now on
production and weaponization for the coming Gulf War. Projects that had
direct relevance to the war effort had priority, and longer-term efforts
were put on hold.
Decisions were also made about what munitions would be deployed
during the war. For example, it was decided that the R-400 bomb, which
had been developed for CW purposes, would also be deployed as a BW
bomb, and that BW agent would also be deployed in Al-Hussein war-
heads. At the time of these decisions neither of the munitions had been
tested with BW agent. According to one senior Iraqi general, the BW pro-
gram at this time took a “hasty, unplanned and badly conceived course.”
However, it was inevitable that the coming war would have had a pro-
found effect on the direction and nature of Iraq's WMD programs. The
ISG notes that the BW program moved into high gear with the aim of
fielding filled weapons as quickly as possible.
Iraq has declared that weaponization of BW agents took place in De-
cember 1990 and January 1991. However, the ordering and timing of
weapons filling and deployment remains unclear, as do precisely which
weapon systems were filled. Tests on R-400 bomb and Al-Hussein mis-
sile warhead remnants confirm that BW agents were filled into these
weapons.
Iraq has also declared that weapons filled with biological agents were
deployed from January to July 1991, although the numbers and locations
of the agents deployed remain uncertain. Iraq declared to UNSCOM in
1995 that authority to launch chemical and biological warheads had been
predelegated in the event that Baghdad was hit by nuclear weapons dur-
ing the Gulf War. UNSCOM pointed out that this predelegation did not
exclude the alternative use of such a capability and therefore did not con-
stitute proof of intentions concerning second use. UNSCOM emphasized
that it must have a complete understanding, for all proscribed weapon
systems, of their intended and actual deployment plans.
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