Biological Weapons in Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Countries - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 168

expected from his testimony. 28 The only documented evidence against
Zhivkov and Stoyanov is a Politburo decree from July 1977 signed by
both, stating that “all measures can be used to neutralize enemy émi-
grés.” 29 As late as 1997, the British government was appealing to Bulgaria
to provide a definitive account of the incident so that the case could be
closed. Sources in Bulgaria reported that there was no new evidence, and
until this was found, nothing further would happen. 30
Conclusion
All prerequisites upon which potential BW programs could build were
present in the non-Soviet WP countries after World War II. At least one of
them, Hungary, already had a staff experienced in BW R&D and moti-
vated to continue the project. Another one, the GDR, had an advanced
chemical industry; even the Biopreparat ordered some of its large equip-
ment there. Czechoslovakia, possessing significant military-medical tradi-
tions, illegally collected pathogen strains relevant to potential weapon-
ization. Bulgaria apparently felt a need for covert biotoxin capability, at
least when it ordered the Markov and Kostov assassinations from the
KGB. The scientific community provided a high level of research and ed-
ucation in biology and medical sciences, providing a suitable background
for BW programs—a potential that might have been realized by some
Third World allies. However, the USSR's determination to maintain a
BW monopoly prohibited most—if not all—of the non-Soviet WP armies
from conducting offensive BW programs. On the other hand, evidence
suggests that East European secret services applied classical drugs, mod-
ern psychoactive drugs, and even biotoxins over several decades to de-
stroy their enemies at home and abroad. The scale of this activity is still
not well understood.