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Leonid Brezhnev. 100 Another rationale for the BW program reportedly
given to Gorbachev by the Soviet military was to help counter the mili-
tary threat posed by China. 101
Shevchenko's memoirs provide some insight into both the decision-
making process and possible reasons why the USSR wished to retain an
offensive BW program. Shevchenko, referring to personal discussions
with Soviet Ministry of Defense officials, said that in the early 1970s the
military was strongly opposed to any arms control or disarmament agree-
ment on chemical or biological weapons partly because such agreements
“could reveal the extent of the development of these weapons and would
show Soviet readiness for their eventual use.” Shevchenko has said that
General Aleksei A. Gryzlov informed him that Defense Minister Andrei
Grechko had instructed the Soviet military not to stop production of BW.
Shevchenko also believes that the Politburo must have known about this
directive. 102
Some sections of the Soviet government appear not to have believed
that the US had in fact abandoned its offensive BW program. This skepti-
cism may have stemmed in part from the deception programs reportedly
run by the US in the 1960s and 1970s to encourage Soviet research into
unproductive, costly research directions in CBW. 103
When considering the rationale for the post-BWC offensive BW pro-
gram, it is also important to take into account the role played by com-
partmentalization of activities and information—both information spe-
cific to the work and more general information regarding the outside
world. According to Pasechnik, workers in The System were, depend-
ing on their level of security classification, given one of four “legends.”
The first-level, “open legend” denied there was a BW program. The sec-
ond-level, “closed legend” acknowledged BW work but said it was de-
fensive. The third-level legend involved providing limited information
about some aspects of offensive work. Finally, individuals cleared for the
fourth-level legend were permitted to know the true nature and scope of
the program. 104
A lack of outside information probably facilitated the justification for
carrying on an offensive program. Many of those involved in the program
were apparently unaware of the BWC's existence. The charge that the US
used BW against North Korea has appeared in some official and semiof-
ficial Russian-language publications, 105
and Chinese and North Korean
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