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tory for a possible full-scale offensive program. There was no clear or
straightforward admission of offensive work, in contrast to the declara-
tions provided by, for example, the UK and US. Since 1992, Russia has
declared that it has no changes to make on this part of the declaration.
Rationale for the Program and BWC Violations
Before the BWC was opened for signature in 1972, the Soviet Union most
often gave the following three reasons for pursuing a BW program: the
US agreement at the end of World War II not to prosecute participants in
Japan's BW program, in exchange for BW information; alleged US use of
BW against North Korea during the Korean War; and a more general
charge that the US was an aggressive “imperialist” country intent on
dominating the world.
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Soviet threat perceptions were heightened by Japan's World War II BW
program.
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However, the extent to which the threat was perceived as be-
ing actual rather than a justification for strengthening Soviet BW-related
capabilities is unclear. On 25-30 December 1949, in Khabarovsk (USSR),
Soviet authorities tried 12 Japanese military personnel for “preparing
and employing” BW.
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The case was based in part on Japanese BW docu-
ments and materials captured by Soviet forces in Manchuria. A commis-
sion of experts was assembled to evaluate these materials and to provide
testimony at the trial. The commission was headed by Nikolai Nikolae-
vich Zhukov-Verezhnikov, a key figure in the postwar Soviet BW pro-
gram.
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It is unclear whether or how Zhukov-Verezhnikov's postwar ex-
perience on the commission influenced his later views.
It has also been suggested that the Soviet Union did not wish to give up
its offensive BW program after 1972 because the military found attractive
the possibility of eliminating the personnel of factories, research facilities,
and the like located deep in an enemy's heartland, far from actual com-
bat, while preserving intact the infrastructure and equipment. It is also
possible that the military simply did not wish to lose part or most of its ex-
isting BW establishment. Another factor in the decision to violate the
BWC may have been the close personal ties enjoyed by key supporters of
maintaining the program (such as Zhukov-Verezhnikov and Smirnov)
with those at the highest levels in government. Smirnov, who was still
head of the 15th Directorate at the time, was reportedly a close friend of
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