The Soviet Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 149

thousand chicken eggs. 82 At Berdsk the visiting team reportedly saw 4 op-
erational 64,000-liter fermenters and an uncompleted building capable of
holding 40 64,000-liter fermenters. When the team visited Obolensk in
January 1994, it noted that the previously inspected explosive test cham-
ber had been removed. 83
The trilateral process had a number of consequences. According to
Alibek, the UK-US visits resulted in a Soviet decision to develop a “com-
pletely new type of mobile biological weapon facility.” 84 Some offen-
sive work at some facilities was curtailed or suspended. One result of
Pasechnik's defection was that Kalinin ordered all offensive work at the
Leningrad facility to be halted and incriminating evidence removed or
destroyed.
The US (and UK) did not publicly discuss the Soviet BW program dur-
ing the trilateral process (except for periodic references to yellow rain and
Sverdlovsk) because they believed that quiet diplomacy would be more
effective in promoting transparency and appropriate follow-up steps. The
process remains suspended.
BWC Data Exchanges
On 8-26 September 1986 the Second Review Conference of the States
Parties to the BWC agreed to submit annual, politically binding data ex-
changes on biological-related information to serve as CBMs. On 9-27
September 1991 the Third Review Conference agreed that information
would be provided in additional areas, including “past offensive and/or
defensive biological research development programmes.” The Soviet
Union (and then the Russian Federation) has submitted information ev-
ery year since late 1987, when the first exchange of information and data
occurred.
The quality and completeness of Russia's CBMs have been questioned,
especially with respect to past programs. The US publicly criticized the
Soviet Union's submission in 1991 during the Third Review Conference
of the States Parties to the BWC. 85 And the British ambassador to Russia,
Sir Rodric Braithwaite, and James F. Collins (the deputy chief of mission
at the US embassy in Moscow) reportedly warned Yeltsin in 1992 to “re-
veal the full extent of the former Soviet biological weapons program or
face public denunciation” at the UN. 86 In June of that year Russia report-