The Soviet Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 148

variola virus work. Among other things, the Soviet Union had not de-
clared to the World Health Organization that it was doing variola virus
work at this facility.
In Moscow on 10-11 September 1992 a joint UK-US mission discussed
BW matters, including the nature of activities at the St. Petersburg Insti-
tute of Highly Pure Biological Preparations. On 14 September 1992 the
three parties issued the Joint Statement on Biological Weapons by the
Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Russian
Federation (10-11 September 1992) (Trilateral Agreement), in which the
states reiterated their commitment to the BWC and agreed to host recip-
rocal visits at selected facilities in order to enhance confidence in treaty
compliance. 78
Under the terms of the agreement, Russia “confirmed the termination
of offensive research, the dismantlement of experimental technological
lines for the production of biological agents, and the closure of the bio-
logical weapons testing facility [apparently Vozrozdeniye Island].” It also
agreed to reduce the number of personnel “involved in biological pro-
grammes” by half, to reduce “military biological research” by 30 percent,
and to dissolve the MOD department responsible for the offensive BW
program (15th Directorate). The agreement stated that access to nonmili-
tary biological sites would be “subject to the need to respect proprietary
information on the basis of agreed principles” and that access to any mili-
tary biological facility would be carried out on a reciprocal basis and be
“subject to the need to respect confidential information on the basis of
agreed principles.” It did, however, also state that access to military and
nonmilitary biological facilities would include “unrestricted access.” 79
A set of US government talking points about the agreement stated that
Russia had again admitted during discussions held in Moscow on 10-11
September 1992 that it had violated the BWC. The points emphasized
that an elaborate and extensive “cover story” was “in many respects still
functioning.” 80
In 1993-94 there was a second round of trilateral visits to the All-Rus-
sian Scientific Research Institute of Veterinary Virology and Microbiology
(in or near Pokrov), the Chemical Plant (Berdsk, near Novosibirsk), the
Chemical Plant (Omutninsk), and the All-Union Scientific Research In-
stitute of Microbiology (Obolensk). 81 At Pokrov the visiting team viewed
hardened underground bunkers capable of holding several hundred