Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
Assessing the Program
There is no authoritative and comprehensive account of the Soviet BW
program based on oral histories and a systematic study of primary, in-
cluding archival, documents. Such an account would describe the evolu-
tion of people, organizations, activities, and policies and would indicate
how official policies and programs were actually implemented. Such an
account would also describe the motivations of the Soviet government in
its decision to pursue an offensive BW program after it had signed the
BWC in 1972.
Two key participants in the Soviet BW program, Kanatjan Baizakovich
Alibekov (who later changed his name to Ken Alibek) and Igor Valeryan-
ovich Domaradsky, have published accounts of their work.
6
A third im-
portant participant, Vladimir Artemovich Pasechnik, defected to the UK
in 1989 and provided much reliable information during his debriefing.
7
However, little of this information is publicly available. A fourth knowl-
edgeable participant who has apparently provided BW-related informa-
tion is V. S. Koshcheev, a former head of the Third Main Directorate of the
Soviet Union's Ministry of Health who now lives in the US.
Some Russian and Soviet journal articles may, in some cases, be viewed
as “official” or otherwise authoritative. The discussion of Soviet or Rus-
sian activities is almost always confined to those related to defensive
aspects, usually vaccine development.
8
Information on vaccine work, in-
cluding the names of the individuals and institutions involved, is proba-
bly reliable. At least three other factors are notable in published Soviet
and Russian works on CBW-related matters. One is the emphasis on the
external CBW threat to the country. Second, there is little or no discus-
sion about Soviet offensive BW work (in contrast to chemical weapons-
related activities, about which there is greater openness).
9
Finally, discus-
sion of BW is sometimes confined to activities in other countries.
Articles have been published in Soviet scientific journals on basic and
applied research that has potential offensive BW applications.
10
In such
cases, no firm conclusions may be drawn in the absence of information
that reveals intent. The consequent uncertainty is reflected in the declas-
sified sections of intelligence estimates by other countries.
Analyses and discussions of civil defense and military doctrine have
also been studied, including information that indicates the views of mili-
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