The French Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 122

were studying 160 biological agents, including Francisella tularensis, Bacil-
lus anthracis, botulinum toxin, staphylococcal enterotoxins, and various
rickettsias and viruses. He also drew attention to US interest in biological
agents as incapacitants and to studies being carried out on diseases carried
by mosquitoes and ticks. The US efforts in the field of biological warfare
were deemed to be very impressive. After hearing Guillot's report, the
SGTEB decided to alert military commanders to the dangers of falling be-
hind in BW research. Throughout the 1960s US-French contacts took
place regularly, all producing the same conclusions: that France's pro-
gram was significantly behind America's. 45
The unofficial decision to relaunch a robust BW program can proba-
bly be dated to the end of 1961, as would appear from remarks made by
the CIEECB chairman at a meeting on 23 January 1962: “for the first
time the need for retaliation has been addressed: the concept of static de-
fense (a type of Maginot Line) based solely on protection, would in fact
lead to disaster.” 46 Information gathered on BW activities in the US con-
tributed significantly to the revival of interest in such weapon programs
among the political and military authorities in France. At a CIEECB meet-
ing on 16 May 1963, General Thiry conceded that “since 1961, in the
wake of several visits to the United States, it has become obvious to the
authorities that [CBW] are not viewed with the importance that they de-
serve.” 47
In February 1962 the general commander of the CIAS proposed a
scheme to advance study, research, and manufacture. On 9 March 1962
Prime Minister Michel Debré informed Pierre Messmer, the armed forces
minister, that the government had decided in principle to relaunch a BW
program. It was not until 29 January 1963, however, that the Conseil de
Défense made clear its stance on this issue. A directive from the ministe-
rial delegate for armaments dated 12 April 1963, referring to decisions
taken at the Conseil de Défense, asked the CIAS “to take stock of the ad-
vances made relating to chemical and biological warfare, and bring to-
gether the aspects necessary to allow the formulation of a plan for chemi-
cal and biological armament.” 48 For the first time since the end of World
War I, France was considering committing the country to maintaining a
BW arsenal and no longer limiting its activities to R&D.
The CEB, as instructed by the ministerial delegate for armament, drew