The French Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 115

• Direct contamination of an area using anthrax spores dispersed by
means of frangible devices without the need for explosive charge. Direct
contamination of the ground using anthrax spores dispersed by bounc-
ing bombs with a weak explosive charge. 23
• Direct contamination of an area with anthrax spores and with a persis-
tent vesicant agent (mustard) dispersed together by bouncing mines. 24
• Susceptibility and modes of infection of cattle to rinderpest virus and
pneumonia virus at the Laboratoire Militaire de Recherches Vétérinaires
(LMRV) at Maisons-Alfort.
The results obtained during this period remain limited from a technical
point of view. Many of the areas explored did not yield conclusive data.
Without underestimating the findings of trials conducted between 1948
and 1953, it is nevertheless appropriate to put the scope of the tests into
context and to conclude, as did Surgeon General Costedoat, that the re-
sults were “mixed,” given the “difficulty of artificially creating sweep-
ing epidemics.” 25 These results, rightly characterized as “mixed,” were
largely explained by the relative inadequacy of the human and finan-
cial resources dedicated to the BW program. This dearth of resources is
attested in a letter from General Ailleret, commandant of special weap-
ons, 26 on 22 January 1952, emphasizing the need “to create a relatively
significant mass of executive officers and assistant officers trained in
chemical, bacteriological, and atomic techniques...whowould serve in
the services responsible for research and experimentation. At the present
time, this mass of educated operatives does not exist: we estimate that the
number of officers truly competent in the fields of chemistry and bacteri-
ology is no greater than 20 and 15, respectively (of which 90 percent are
military veterinarians).” 27
Nevertheless, the knowledge acquired should not be underestimated,
especially in the case of lyophilization of aerobic and anaerobic bacte-
ria and the aerosolized dispersion of bacterial suspensions. These tests
also enabled scientists to document the serious infection of war wounds
through the use of contaminated artillery, infection by pulmonary inha-
lation using microbial aerosols with very weak doses of chemical agents,
and the triggering of enzootics through the dissemination of pathogenic
germs.
On 26 August 1952 the minister of defense, René Pleven, along with
the secretary of state for war, approved the creation of the Commis-