Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
lished by the US National Security Council in May 1969. Did they know
that Secretary of Defense Laird, the State Department, the ACDA, and
the President's Scientific Advisory Committee all disagreed with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff that biological weapons had a future in US strategic plan-
ning? And did they anticipate that after eight months of intense negotia-
tions, the Nixon administration would adopt three bold initiatives: to rat-
ify the 1925 Geneva Protocol, with certain qualifications; to pledge “no
first use” of “lethal” chemical weapons; and to abolish the US offensive
BW program? Unfortunately, answers to these questions remain difficult,
given restrictions on key US and Canadian documents for this period.
59
Consequently, it is not clear why Nixon's momentous unilateral re-
nunciation of 25 November 1969 caught the Canadian government so
completely by surprise. But it did.
60
Indeed, Minister of Defence Marcel
Cadieux, when grilled in the House of Commons, had to rely on an article
published in the
Montreal Gazette
for details about Nixon's statement; and
even then he got it wrong. But an official Canadian response was soon
forthcoming, and it came in two parts.
First was the Cabinet policy statement of 11 December, which adopted
an even more sweeping BW disarmament position than the US—since it
also included toxin weapons (which the US later added in March 1970).
The second stage was Canada's official declaration about CBW, which was
issued on 24 March 1970, not by Prime Minister Trudeau but by the vet-
eran diplomat George Ignatieff.
61
In his eloquent speech on 24 March at the CCD meetings in Geneva,
Ignatieff stressed that “Canada never has had and does not now possess
any biological weapon (or toxins) and does not intend to develop, pro-
duce, acquire, stockpile or use such weapons in the future.” He quickly
added, however, that until a CW convention became a reality Canada
would reserve the right to use CW in retaliation and would carry out de-
fensive CBW research activities. Thus both the DRES and DREO opera-
tions would be continued, albeit on a reduced basis. More specifically,
Suffield scientists would continue their work in developing CW and BW
detection systems and protective equipment for Canadian troops facing
CBW, as well as carrying out research “towards resolving problems asso-
ciated with the verification of a comprehensive ban on chemical and bio-
logical warfare that may be concluded.”
62
In September 1971 Canada enthusiastically endorsed the draft BWC,
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