Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
also secret plans to stage a mock BW attack, using the simulant
Bacillus
globigii,
which was cancelled at the last moment because of concerns
about negative public opinion. Indeed, throughout the late 1960s the Ca-
nadian peace movement and leftist groups consistently portrayed Suffield
as an evil and dangerous place, a symbol of Canada's connection with US
“militarism and imperialism.”
51
In addition, there was strong pressure from the Department of External
Affairs (DEA), which was outraged that Operation Vacuum was being
held at the same time that Canada was involved with important CBW
arms control negotiations in Geneva. But defense officials remained ada-
mant that Canada should fulfill its alliance commitments. This position
was outlined in December 1968, when Brigadier General H. Tellier, on
behalf of the Chiefs of the General Staff, issued an official statement
about its future CBW policies. Although he admitted that nothing had
been done to implement the secret directive of May 1963, Tellier argued
that the time had now arrived for decisive action:
The new policy proposes that agreements should be reached with our
Allies whereby suitable weapons can be made available . . . Discussions
with the US Army are in the very early stages. They are aimed at deter-
mining the costs involved in providing a retaliatory capacity. I would
emphasize that the Canadian Forces have no intention of holding B or
CW munitions in Canada or in Europe. Our requirements would be held
in British or American stockpiles, to be supplied in the event B or CW is
employed against NATO forces.
52
A related development was the October 1968 Third Tripartite Intelli-
gence Conference on CBW in Ottawa. Its agenda focused on three major
problems: “the potential impact of new scientific developments on the
threat to the Western world from biological and chemical warfare...the
capabilities of those nations whose intentions we have reason to suspect,
and [the need] to define those areas . . . where more collaboration be-
tween the participating intelligence organizations is needed.” Since Can-
ada had “virtually no facilities for the collecting of scientific intelligence,”
there was great concern in Ottawa that nothing should threaten access to
US and UK sources, including unfavorable publicity about the proceed-
ings.
53
Throughout the remainder of 1968 the Departments of National De-
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