Travel Reference
In-Depth Information
tutions that, over time, placed Guatemalan land in the hands of a wealthy few to the detri-
ment of indigenous peasants. It is estimated that 2 percent of the country's population con-
trolled 72 percent of all arable land in 1945, but only 12 percent of it was being utilized.
Central to the law were stipulations limiting expropriation to lands lying fallow. Arbenz
himself was not immune from land expropriation, giving up 1,700 acres of his own land in
the process. Also among the lands to be expropriated were extensive holdings by United
FruitcededtothecompanyunderEstradaCabreraandUbico,whichhadmadeUnitedFruit
Guatemala'slargestlandowner.Fully85percentofitsholdingsremaineduncultivated.The
Agrarian Reform Law allowed for the compensation of expropriated lands based on values
declared for tax purposes, which United Fruit had, of course, grossly underreported.
Unfortunately for Arbenz and his reformist policies, UFCo had strong ties to the U.S.
government and,more specifically,the CIA.AmongUnited Fruit'sshareholders were U.S.
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and his brother, CIA Director Allen Dulles.
On the home front, it was clear that Arbenz had incurred the wrath of the oligarchy
and conservative military sectors. He faced increasing political fragmentation despite at-
tempts to forge a functional revolutionary coalition of political parties to further his goals,
and he looked to several dedicated, competent individuals for support in implementing the
agrarian reform and labor organization. Many inside and outside of Guatemala conveni-
entlylabeledArbenzandhissupportersCommunist,thoughhowmuchinfluencetheCom-
munistsactuallyhadinGuatemalaisstillhotlydebated.In1952Guatemala'sofficialCom-
munist party, the Partido Guatemalteco de los Trabajadores (PGT, the Guatemalan Labor
Party), was legalized. Communists subsequently gained considerable minority influence
over important peasant organizations and labor unions, but not over the governing political
body, winning only 4 of 58 seats.
In any case, the country became increasingly unstable. This instability, combined with
Arbenz's tolerance of the PGT and other Communist and labor influences, caused Wash-
ingtontogrowincreasinglyalarmed.TheCIAfinallyorchestratedtheoverthrowofArbenz
in 1954 in the form of a military invasion from Honduras dubbed “Operation Success,” led
by two exiled Guatemalan military officers. The invading forces established Colonel Car-
los Castillo Armas, who had previously led a failed coup against Arbenz, as chief of state.
A series of military governments supported by the nascent military oligarchy partnership
and conservative elements of Guatemalan society followed. Thus began one of the most
tragic chapters in Guatemala's already turbulent history.
With the professionalization of Guatemala's army now in place thanks to the policies of
Barrios and Ubico, the military was now poised to become the country's dominating polit-
ical force and would do so for the next 30 years. Further paving the way for military dom-
