Social: Theories and Models - Foundations for Designing User-Centered Systems - page 254

task will be repeated, usually by the same people. This should help to change the
perspective of the team members from one that may be initially oriented towards
competition to one that supports cooperation.
The second suggestion, change the payoffs, is perhaps the easiest to influence.
In the case of online communities this can be done by noting which people
contribute the most. The form of the payoffs needs to be carefully worked out.
They need not necessarily be financial. In social networks, prestige and recognition
(which raise an individual's perceived status) are often valued more highly as
rewards than monetary incentives.
To teach people to care about each other requires including other people's
payoffs in your own matrix. This may be purely altruistic, when team members
care about other team members. In some cases, such as the prisoner's dilemma,
other people's payoffs may influence your own payoff (positively or negatively).
The fourth suggestion is to teach reciprocity. Participants should be taught to
use tit-for-tat strategies. In social situations some people will always adopt a
straight cooperation strategy, whilst others will adopt a defection strategy. Having
some participants play tit-for-tat (reciprocity) and change strategy based on what
others do helps to police the environment and protect those who cannot or will not
follow a more aggressive strategy.
Finally, the need to improve recognition abilities relates to the issue of trust. Most
web sites with forums require you to register to make comments. When you buy
online you want to know who you are interacting with. Companies, both real and
online, tell you how long they have existed, how to find and contact them, and what
organizations they belong to (like chambers of commerce). By making themselves
more recognizable (and establishing their credentials), others can tell who they are
working with, and can expect to find them again if they return later to the same place.
Note that cooperation is not necessarily always a good thing. In regulation, rule
enforcement, and auditing situations, for example, you do not want the inspectors
to have a long-term relationship with the party being inspected. Long-term rela-
tionships in these cases lead to cooperation, not enforcement.
You should also be aware that supporting teamwork with team goals may lead
to social loafing. This is where team members get a payoff based on the team's
overall performance, rather than on their individual performance. Some team
members may decide that this means that they can achieve their payoff without
pulling their weight and contributing as much as the other members.
All these suggestions can be used to improve social interactions in large,
complex systems where social factors are at play. Consider as an example eBay.
On an individual level it implements many or all of these suggestions: eBay does
not publish the profits of individuals (it cannot, but it would not). It does not
defect; it cooperates and prosecutes (or drops sellers). It does not have a complex
set of rules. On the level of its community, it encourages through its page design
future sales. It takes steps to make the payoffs better with cooperation between
buyer and seller and with eBay. We do not know whether it teaches about caring