Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
and trade in these chemicals from within the institution, even if only for a limited time,
they were less likely to stay out of the institution and lose their ability to trade in chemi-
cals with members. While it is impossible to know how key a role this particular incentive
played in bringing developing countries into the Montreal Protocol, it may well have
played a signi
man, 1996).
The third of the reasons for interfering with international trade in the context of an
MEA is as an enforcement mechanism. An example of this use in action can be found in
the Catch Documentation Scheme, a mechanism developed by the Convention for the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) to help enforce its
quotas on catches of Patagonian tooth
fi
cant role (DeSombre and Kau
ff
sh (also known as Chilean seabass). This agree-
ment calls on member states to import only those
fi
ed as caught within
the quotas agreed to within CCAMLR (CCAMLR, 2006). Non-certi
fi
sh that are certi
fi
sh, even
though they are otherwise identical, are thereby refused legal entry into most of the
world's biggest
fi
ed
fi
fi
sh markets. As a result, the price of certi
fi
ed
fi
sh is far higher than the
price of non-certi
fi
ed
fi
sh, punishing
fi
shers for
fi
shing outside of quota and giving them
an incentive to
sh within (DeSombre, 2005). This mechanism overlaps with the second
reason, in that it provides an incentive for non-member states to join, thereby giving their
fi
fi
shers access to a broader range of markets. But it a
ff
ects the incentives of individual
fi
shers as well as those of states, and thus acts as enforcement mechanism as well as an
inducement.
These are only three examples of some 20 MEAs that have trade-a
ecting provisions
(WTO, 2007). All of these provisions exist for one, or a combination, of these three
reasons. The relationship between the provisions and international trade rules, particu-
larly the rules of the WTO, is unclear. To this point, no complaint about trade restrictions
undertaken because of MEA commitments has been brought to the WTO (WTO, 2007).
On the one hand, this suggests that countries adversely a
ff
ff
ected by such restrictions are
not con
dent that they could win such a case in trade court. On the other hand, it means
that there is no explicit precedent that MEA trade restrictions are compatible with inter-
national trade rules. As noted above, this issue is under negotiation at the WTO, but there
is at this point no indication that a consensus among members can be reached. As such,
it may well be the case that the relationship between trade-a
fi
ecting MEAs and interna-
tional trade rules remains unclear for the foreseeable future. At the same time, though,
DSM jurisprudence seems to suggest a strong bias toward deference to multilateral envi-
ronmental cooperation (DeSombre and Barkin, 2002).
Most environmental IOs, like the three examples discussed here, are designed to deal
with speci
ff
c issues. But there are some that are designed to oversee international envi-
ronmental cooperation more broadly. One of these, the CEC, has already been discussed,
having been created in the context of the NAFTA environmental side-agreement. The
biggest of these general-purpose environmental institutions, with the broadest remit, is
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Unlike the MEAs discussed
above, UNEP tends not to regulate state behavior directly. It generally oversees the cre-
ation of new special-purpose MEAs to deal with speci
fi
c issues (and often acts as secre-
tariat for these MEAs), rather than regulating in its own right (on UNEP and its
relationship with MEAs, see DeSombre, 2006). As such, it does not a
fi
ect international
trade rules directly. But some scholars of international environmental politics argue that
it should be expanded to include (or replaced by an institution that includes) a direct
ff
