Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
genetically modi
fi
ed corn; this meant that the whole US corn crop had to be treated as
genetically modi
ed food
of any variety, this was a death blow to exports: US corn exports to the EU were above
$100 million per year in the early 1990s but essentially vanished soon after the large-scale
introduction of genetically modi
fi
ed. Since European consumers have rejected genetically modi
fi
fi
ed corn, falling to $8 million or less per year from 1999
on (FAS, 2006).
A similar but larger loss occurred in meatpacking, when US producers failed to respond
appropriately to foreign consumers' fears of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE),
or mad cow disease. US annual beef exports were around $3 billion worldwide from 2000
to 2003. Then the discovery of mad cow disease in the USA in late 2003 led to worldwide
rejection of US beef. Exports dropped to $550 million in 2004 and remained below $1
billion in 2005 (FAS, 2006).
In most countries that have faced BSE problems, the response has involved a high level
of testing for the disease to ensure that the food supply is safe. US regulators, however,
have insisted on testing only a sample, in most years only a small fraction of 1 percent, of
all slaughtered cattle. Following the detection of two North American BSE cases in 2003,
the pace of testing was temporarily increased, reaching an all-time peak of just over
1 percent of all cattle slaughtered in the USA in 2005 and early 2006, before dropping
back to a much lower level in late 2006. By way of comparison, BSE testing is done on
48 percent of cattle slaughtered in Europe, and 100 percent in Japan (USDA, 2005).
Additional testing, which could have reassured foreign markets, was rejected by the
USA, even when private parties wanted to perform and pay for the tests. In 2004,
Creekstone Farms, a Kansas beef producer, negotiated an agreement with the Japanese
government to resume sales in Japan if Creekstone voluntarily adopted Japanese BSE
testing standards. However, the Department of Agriculture invoked old food safety laws
(written to prevent too little testing, a century earlier) to prohibit any American producer
from exceeding US government BSE testing standards. Over $2 billion of annual exports
were lost for at least two years, in order to maintain the principle that US industry does
not need to meet other countries' safety standards.
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While US beef exports have now
edged back up, some export markets may have been permanently lost to other beef pro-
ducing nations such as Australia.
A di
erent outcome occurred in the wheat industry, one of the most export-dependent
sectors of US agriculture. Roughly half of the US wheat crop is exported, with exports of
wheat and wheat products to the EU-15
ff
uctuating around $200 million in recent years
(FAS, 2006). Monsanto, a leading supplier of seeds and agricultural chemicals, applied
for permission to grow genetically modi
fl
ed 'Roundup-Ready' wheat in the USA and
Canada in 2002. Recognizing the threat to export markets, advocacy groups throughout
wheat-growing areas organized an e
fi
ed wheat.
The campaign quickly gained support from the Montana Legislature, the Canadian
Wheat Board and other major organizations in the region. In 2004, Monsanto announced
the withdrawal of its application to grow genetically modi
ff
ective campaign against genetically modi
fi
ed wheat (OCA, 2006).
The high price of failing to meet other countries' health and safety regulations is
painfully clear in the recent histories of the US corn and beef industries: genetically
modi
fi
ed crops mean a loss of access to foreign markets, and the prohibition on interna-
tionally accepted levels of testing for mad cow disease crippled the beef export business,
including meatpackers that wanted to meet those testing levels at their own expense.
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