Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
Recently, this danger has become apparent in the proposals being made for a climate
tax or tari
ed the Kyoto
Protocol to the UN Climate Change Convention or are not controlling their greenhouse
gas emissions (Bennhold, 2007, p. 10). Because many governments are not cooperating on
addressing greenhouse gas emissions and other energy conservation challenges, frustra-
tion is spilling out into the trade arena. In the case of climate change, trade measures are
being suggested as a way either to level the playing
ff
to be imposed on imports from countries that have not rati
fi
fi
eld between countries with di
ff
erent
levels of energy tax or to induce free-riding countries to cooperate gainfully.
Because the WTO is a functional international organization with a mandate for trade,
WTO law does not generally address government policies beyond trade, but rather leaves
those issues to environmental institutions. This approach has clear advantages and dis-
advantages. The advantage is that the WTO sticks to its technical competence and leaves
environmental decisions to organizations with that technical competence. The disadvan-
tage is that in trade and environment, the WTO looks only at one side of a problem. For
example, in the
United States-Shrimp
case, the WTO considered the appropriateness of
the US import ban directed at countries that the US government believed were not ade-
quately protecting sea turtles. But the WTO did not consider whether the complaining
governments were adequately protecting sea turtles. Because it is partial rather than
holistic, WTO dispute settlement may not be able to achieve a satisfactory solution to
complex disputes regarding the 'ecolonomy', that is, the overlay of the world ecology and
economy.
This legal point has an analogue in the economic critiques of international trade law
and WTO negotiations that point to the uncertainty as to whether trade liberalization will
always bene
t the participating countries. For example, the impact of services regulation
on an economy will depend to some extent on whether the liberalizing government has an
adequate regulatory regime in place. In other words, an adequate regulatory regime can
be viewed as a precondition of fully bene
fi
ting from trade liberalization. The same point
can be made regarding whether a government has in place an adequate legal system, ade-
quate competition policy, adequate openness to investment, adequate adjustment assis-
tance for workers and farmers, and adequate environmental controls. All of these policy
preconditions have in common the fact that the WTO generally does not have rules assur-
ing that non-trade policies are adequate for trade liberalization.
Beginning with Agenda 21 (1992), governments have a
fi
rmed that trade and environ-
ment policies should be 'mutually supportive in favour of sustainable development'.
4
This mantra is inscribed in the Doha Ministerial Declaration where the WTO members
state: 'We are convinced that the aims of upholding and safeguarding an open and non-
discriminatory multilateral trading system, and acting for the protection of the environ-
ment and the promotion of sustainable development can and must be mutually
supportive.'
5
This phraseology has been adoptable because there is something in it for all
sides of the debate. Those who view the trading system as already supportive of the envi-
ronment can point to the way that trade can positively contribute to environmental goals.
On the other hand, those who are skeptical of the bene
ts of trade for the environment
see the mutual supportiveness as a commitment by the WTO to carry out the Doha
agenda in a way that actually does deliver some environmental bene
fi
fi
ts. My guess is that
if there is a Doha Round agreement, it will contain signi
fi
cant environmental language
(Lamy, 2007).
