Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
other words, domestic producers cannot be favored over foreign producers. The national
restriction must also be proportionate to the identi
ed environmental policy goal and be
the least trade-restrictive option for achieving that goal. In addition, the Court has rec-
ognized that the exact balance between environmental and market interests is case
speci
fi
fi
c; each case needs to be assessed individually.
European politics of trade and environment
EU organizations play many critical roles. The Commission has been instrumental in
strengthening EU legal and political authority as a result of its growing role in setting
European political agendas, developing policy proposals and supervising national imple-
mentation (Selin, 2007). The expansion of quali
ed majority voting in the Council has
resulted in accelerated EU policy-making on a host of environment and human health
issues. EU environmental policy-making has also bene
fi
ted from an expansion of the
Parliament's powers. The Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty established the exist-
ing co-decision procedure with formal decision-making equality between the Council and
the Parliament on most environmental issues. The Parliament's Environment Committee
has been particularly active in strengthening EU's environmental standards (Burns, 2005).
The development of the free movement of people, goods, services and capital on the inter-
nal market is one of the core tasks of the Commission. Thus the Commission develops envi-
ronmental policy proposals and monitors national implementation of EU environmental
law, simultaneously protecting the internal market. If a member state wants to restrict the
import and sale of a particular product on environmental and human-health-related
grounds, it has to demonstrate that such action meets the Court's established criteria of non-
discrimination and proportionality. Trade and environment relationships are complex,
however. Sometimes member states restrict the movement of a product on environmental
and human health grounds. Other times, member states use the dynamics of the internal
market harmonization to strengthen EU environmental and public health standards.
The Court in several early cases elaborated on the principles of non-discrimination
and proportionality, striking down speci
fi
fi
c domestic regulations. This included a high
pro
ort to restrict the import of the French liqueur Cassis de Dijon because
its alcohol content was not high enough to meet the German de
fi
le German e
ff
nition - and thereby
requirement for import - of a 'liqueur.' The German government, justifying this restric-
tion on public health grounds, argued that the health of German consumers was threat-
ened because alcoholic beverages with low alcohol strength induced excessive
consumption, creating an increased tolerance for alcohol. The Court in 1979 ruled that
a
fi
ed on human
health grounds, and that an import ban was disproportionate (Koppen, 1993; Vogel,
1995).
Similarly, in 1984 the Court ruled against a German law restricting the import of beer
containing additives based on domestic
Reinheitsgebot
rules. The case was brought by a
French brewer complaining to the Commission that Germany prohibited the import of
his beer, which contained additives permitted in France. Germany maintained that the law
was designed to protect public health, while the Commission and other member states
believed that it was largely an e
fi
xed minimum alcohol content exclusively for liqueurs could not be justi
fi
ort to protect domestic producers from foreign competi-
tion. The Court argued that because there were no common Community standards on
additives, member states had the right to determine which additives could be used.
ff
