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Conway, 2005; Kleckner, 2006). In other words, to the extent that the transatlantic dispute
does not suppress bottom-up processes in developing countries, we are likely to see, within
the next few years, more pragmatism and recognition that some agri-biotech applications
may, under particular conditions, indeed o
ff
er bene
fi
ts to farmers and consumers in devel-
oping countries.
5. Normative dilemma and potential solutions
The transatlantic GMO dispute is interesting also from another normative perspective.
Normative, in this context, does not refer to debates on whether GMOs are ethical in
whatever sense. It refers to the question of who should be entitled to decide on the
approval of GMOs or particular biotech applications for research, commercial cultiva-
tion and marketing. In essence, such decisions can be taken by the market (i.e. by pro-
ducers and consumers), voters and/or their representatives (policy-makers), scientists, or
any combination of the three.
The US approach to GMO policy relies heavily on the
rst (market) and third (science)
element, the EU approach largely on the second (political decision) and third (science).
In the EU, the political has clearly trumped the scienti
fi
c element. This is most apparent
in those cases where proposals by the EU Commission to force countries with unilateral
bans on EU-approved GM crops to lift these bans have been rejected by the Council of
Ministers - the Council is composed of ministers from all EU member-country govern-
ments. The reasoning of the majority in those cases has been, very explicitly, that they do
not wish to overrule countries whose population and government do not want to import,
cultivate and/or consume GMOs. The WTO's SPS Agreement (and also US policy), in
contrast, operates with scienti
fi
c risk-assessment criteria, with some room for maneuver
left by the precautionary principle. Supporters of the scienti
fi
fi
c approach claim that
'sound science' is the only e
ective and non-arbitrary barrier to trade-restricting envi-
ronment, health and safety regulations that serve protectionist, rent-seeking purposes.
Critics of this approach argue that science cannot, in the case of GMOs, o
ff
ff
er conclusive
evidence on risks and bene
ts, and that science-based decision-making is tantamount to
'technocracy' rather than democracy (see Jasano
fi
, 2005).
Switzerland is the most extreme example of the political approach. In its system of
direct democracy, the government must call a public vote on initiatives that are signed by
at least 100 000 voters. In November 2005, an initiative imposing a
ff
ve-year moratorium
on all commercial cultivation of GM crops was approved with a 56% majority. Surveys
carried out thereafter have established that around 10-15% of No-voters meant to reject
GMOs and thus voted the wrong way (the reverse error was much less important). Hence
the
de facto
Yes-vote was in the order of 70% (Hirter and Linder, 2005). Whether the
moratorium will be extended will become clear in late 2010. Given that the WTO panel in
the EU-US dispute found the EU's
de facto
moratorium from 1998 to 2003 as well as the
unilateral EU member state bans to be in violation of WTO rules, the Swiss moratorium
may well violate the SPS Agreement also: it is based on a purely political decision, and
not a scienti
fi
c risk assessment (although risk assessments on GM crops in Switzerland
have been carried out). However, most proponents of the 'sound science' approach would
concede that the Swiss decision was as democratic as such a decision can possibly be.
There is no obvious solution to this dilemma that would satisfy both 'sound science' and
democracy requirements. We can primarily highlight that the dilemma exists, and that the
fi
