Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
gain the momentum requested by the plainti
s in the WTO case. Moreover, if the unilat-
eral bans could be supported by country-speci
ff
c risk assessments, which would presum-
ably make them compatible with the SPS Agreement, this would still not satisfy the
plainti
fi
s. Finally, even if more GM crops were approved and cultivated in Europe they
would be greeted by
ff
erce NGO campaigns, less-than-enthusiastic consumers, and risk-
averse retailers. And all this would happen in a setting where, according to the law, GM
products have to bear a clearly visible label (EU labeling regulation was not challenged in
the WTO case). Hence it appears very unlikely that the WTO verdict will mark the end of
the transatlantic trade con
fi
ict over GMOs.
In more general terms, a reversal of the EU's GMO policy is unlikely because of low
public acceptance of GM food, low trust in regulators, pressure by NGOs, signi
fl
cant
opposition to GM crops among farmers, strong incentives of food processors and retail-
ers to stay away or withdraw from the market for labeled GM foods, and institutional
inertia in EU policy-making. The dominance of GMO-adverse interests in the EU is bol-
stered by the characteristics of regulatory federalism in the EU. Decision-making struc-
tures in the EU allow GMO-adverse minorities to block e
fi
orts to relax existing standards.
In addition, a combination of multi-level decision-making, substantial regulatory auton-
omy of EU countries, and concerns about safeguarding the EU's internal market encour-
age a 'ratcheting-up' of GMO regulations rather than downward harmonization.
The USA, for its part, is unlikely to move toward the EU model of GMO policy any
time soon. Potential con
ff
rms in view of precari-
ous export opportunities for GM crops have been reduced through increased government
subsidies for US farmers. In addition to low interest group ('bottom-up') pressure for
stricter agri-biotech regulation, the characteristics of US regulatory federalism act against
more restrictive GMO policies. In the unlikely event that consumer pressure for tighter
rules grew, heavily constrained regulatory autonomy of US states in agri-biotech matters,
combined with centralized decision-making at the federal level, would slow down any
'contagion' e
fl
icts between US farmers and biotech
fi
ect that might emanate from individual US states trying to impose more
restrictive policies.
ff
4. Consequences for other countries
Whether regulatory polarization and transatlantic trade con
ict over GMOs will continue
and for how long depends not only on domestic processes in the EU and the USA. It also
depends on developments at the global level. If most countries other than the USA and
the EU moved toward the EU policy model for GMOs, this would create pressure for
stricter regulation in the USA. Pressure for more liberal rules in the EU would grow if
most other countries moved toward the US model. But for the time being the world's two
largest economies are clearly the principal drivers of worldwide regulatory activity on
GMOs. Their policy choices limit the options of other countries, particularly those that
are economically dependent on the EU, the USA, or both. Switzerland, Norway, and
Central and Eastern European countries have thus aligned with the EU, and Canada with
the USA. Other countries, which are less dependent on EU or US markets, e.g. China,
Brazil, India, Japan and Russia, have adopted regulations whose stringency lies some-
where in between the EU and the US model. GMO policy in these countries is very recent
and very much in
fl
fl
ux. Both the EU and the USA have been battling for in
fl
uence on the
regulatory policies of these countries.
