Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
erences in
consumer perceptions, activity of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), interests
and behavior of biotech
Bernauer (2003) explains transatlantic di
ff
erences primarily in terms of di
ff
rms, farmers, processors and retailers, and institutional char-
acteristics of the political systems concerned. This explanation takes into account market
processes as well as domestic and international political processes. The explanation com-
bines two theoretical perspectives. The
fi
fi
rst views regulation as the result of a struggle
for political and market in
erent interest groups within the EU and the
USA; i.e. among input suppliers (agri-biotech
fl
uence among di
ff
rms), farmers, processors and retailers,
and consumer and environmental groups. It illuminates why these groups have di
fi
erent
preferences, and when and why particular interests prevail in the policy-making process.
The second perspective looks at the e
ff
ect of interactions among political sub-units (EU
countries, US states) in federalist political systems (the EU, the USA). The
ff
fi
rst perspec-
tive focuses on societal in
fl
uences operating from the individual or
fi
rm level upward
(bottom up). The second centers on the e
ects of system-wide political structures and
institutions (top-down perspective). In the EU, both processes have operated in ways that
have driven GMO policy toward greater stringency. In the USA, they have operated in
ways that have sustained GMO-friendly regulation. As to the
ff
rst perspective, Bernauer's
(2003) analysis shows that the collective action capacity of environmental and consumer
interests has varied substantially between the EU and the USA. This variation can be
traced back to di
fi
erences in public perceptions of agricultural biotechnology, consumer
trust in regulatory authorities, and institutional settings. Due to more negative consumer
attitudes toward GMOs and lower public trust in regulatory agencies, the collective
action capacity of GMO-adverse European environmental and consumer groups has
been higher than the capacity of their US counterparts. Transatlantic di
ff
ff
erences in the
extent and nature of NGOs' GMO campaigns re
ect this variation in collective action
capacity. GMO-adverse groups in Europe have thus been more successful in shaping
markets for the technology than GMO-adverse groups in the USA. Negative public atti-
tudes towards GMOs in combination with more institutional access due to more frag-
mented (multi-level) policy-making has also enabled GMO-adverse interests in Europe
to exert more in
fl
uence on policy-making. In the USA less negative public attitudes
toward GMOs and a centralized regulatory system for GMOs have acted against GMO-
adverse interests.
The collective action capacity of pro-GMO interests has also varied substantially
between the EU and the USA. In Europe, negative public attitudes and NGO campaigns
have driven a wedge between biotech
fl
rms on the one hand and food processors, retail-
ers and farmers on the other. Thus they have reduced the collective action capacity of pro-
GMO interests. The pro-GMO coalition in Europe has been crippled not by protectionist
'piggy-backing' by some producers (notably farmers) - a key claim in US attacks on the
EU's GMO regulation. It has been weakened because those
fi
rms most vulnerable to
market pressure spearheaded by NGOs, notably food processors and retailers, have been
pushed toward support for stricter regulation. In contrast, in the USA a cohesive and well-
organized pro-GMO producer coalition has prevailed due to more positive public atti-
tudes and weaker campaigns by GMO-adverse NGOs. Di
fi
erences in industrial structure
(particularly higher concentration, in both economic and organizational terms, of the EU
than the US retail sector) also play a role in explaining why the pro-GMO producer coali-
tion has been much weaker in the EU than in the USA.
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