Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
14
Trade con
fl
ict over genetically modi
fi
ed organisms
Thomas Bernauer and Philipp Aerni
In 2003 the USA, seconded by Argentina and Canada, initiated litigation in the World
Trade Organization (WTO) against the European Union's regulatory policy for geneti-
cally modi
fi
ed organisms (GMOs). The three plainti
ff
s claimed that the EU's GMO policy
was creating illegal trade restrictions. Speci
cally, they argued (1) that the EU had imple-
mented a
de facto
moratorium on approval of new biotech crop varieties; that (2) the EU
had failed to approve some particular GM crops for which US
fi
rms were seeking
approval; and (3) that several EU countries were unilaterally banning the import and mar-
keting of GM crops that had been approved at the EU level. The WTO Dispute
Settlement Panel's verdict (a 2000-page document!), issued in September 2006, supports
the plainti
fi
s' position to a large extent and asks the EU to bring its GMO approval
process in line with WTO rules. As of December 2007, it appeared very unlikely that the
EU would be willing or able to comply with the WTO verdict. The EU's GMO legislation
had been overhauled even before the WTO panel issued its verdict. But the EU decision-
making process for GMO approvals has remained complex and subject to political con-
siderations rather than scienti
ff
c risk assessment alone: it involves the European Food
Safety Authority (EFSA), which has an advisory role, as well as the EU Commission and
Council of Ministers, which hold the decision-making authority.
Why does the WTO trade dispute on GMOs, one of more than 300 WTO disputes since
1995, deserve a full chapter in this topic? We submit that this dispute is interesting because
it pits countries with a predominantly GMO-adverse public (Europe) against countries
whose GMO policy is driven by large, export-oriented farmers and the biotech industry
(primarily the USA, to some extent also Argentina and Canada). These circumstances
raise di
fi
cations for trade-restricting envi-
ronment, health and safety policies. Most European governments and the EU take the
position that the precautionary principle (a 'better safe than sorry' approach to regula-
tion in the presence of uncertainty about risks posed by GMOs) and the prevailing GMO
skepticism among consumers and voters are su
cult questions with respect to legitimate justi
fi
cation for a restrictive policy.
The USA, in contrast, claims that WTO rules, particularly those of the Agreement on
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), mandate a strong 'sound science'
discipline. From the latter perspective, trade-restricting GMO policies are permitted only
to the extent that they are supported by scienti
cient justi
fi
c evidence on risks.
The analytical (positive) and normative issues raised by the transatlantic GMO dispute
extend far beyond the dispute itself. Analytically, the GMO dispute raises the question of
why regulatory policies in the USA and the EU have, over the past 10-15 years, moved in
di
fi
erent directions. It will be noted that GMOs is not the only area where this has been
the case. Several other environment, health and safety policy issues have followed a similar
pattern, e.g. electronic waste regulation, toxic waste trade policy and climate change
policy. From a normative viewpoint, the GMO dispute raises the question of whether
science and global institutions with judicial authority (such as the WTO) relying on
ff
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