Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
1(e)). There is a Foro Consultivo Económico y Social, created by the Protocol of Ouro
Preto in 1994, which has spaces designed for businesses and unions, but o
ers few oppor-
tunities for environmental or other activists (Botto and Tussie, 2003, p. 32). Indeed, busi-
ness groups actively sought to exclude other social groups from this consultative forum.
In the case of both the Foro and the Comisión, described below, Hochstetler concludes
(2003b, p. 212 [my translation]) they 'only have consultative functions that make them cul
de sacs for political participation'.
It is important to emphasize that control of decision-making has rested with national
governments within Mercosur. The majority of decisions regarding Mercosur are taken
by national presidents and their economic and diplomatic advisers with little input from
citizens. The process has been led by national ministers and ministries of foreign a
ff
airs
and economy through bodies such as the Mercosur Consejo del Mercado Común.
Primary responsibility for implementation is given to the Grupo del Mercado Común,
made up of representatives from the national economic and foreign ministries and central
banks. Unlike NAFTA, the dispute resolution mechanisms within Mercosur, which in
theory could provide an opening for citizen engagement, are underdeveloped and,
speci
ff
cally, there are no environmental dispute resolution mechanisms. As Hochstetler
(2003a, p. 13) puts it 'in practice, most con
fi
icts are resolved through direct negotiations
among the region's national presidents, a forum not especially open to broad social par-
ticipation'. Even the joint parliament (Comisión Parlamentaria Conjunta) is made up
simply of selected members of the national congresses of the member countries and, while
in theory this provides more opportunities for engagement by civil society actors, it is
structurally very weak and therefore plays a limited role in key decision-making.
NGOs often have fewer established ties and points of access to those ministries leading
the Mercosur negotiations. This re
fl
ects a broader trend within trade policy-making
where ministries with the weakest ties to environmental groups have the strongest
in
fl
uence over the direction of policy. As Alanis-Ortega and Gonzalez-Lutzenkirchen
(2002, p. 44) note,
fl
Within Mexico, the Economic Ministry exerts extensive in
uence on environmental policy deci-
sion-making, regulations and practices that could influence economic or trade activity. At the
international level, Mexico's Economic Ministry actively negotiates for Mexico in multilateral
environmental forums where trade questions arise.
fl
In this sense, o
cials from these ministries get to exercise a veto over environmental policy
measures with which they disagree.
Those regional environmental institutions of Mercosur that do exist are essentially a
gathering of the (currently) four national environmental agencies. The working subcom-
mittees of Mercosur have no permanent agenda or roles, except in the most general sense
to enable the realization of the goals of the Treaty of Asunción, leaving them little capac-
ity to act as autonomous policy entrepreneurs. Weak institutions in this regard equate
with fewer channels of access or mechanisms of in
uence, however indirect, regarding key
power brokers within the foreign and trade ministries. It is clear, then, that the majority
of opportunities that environmental activists could make use of within the Mercosur deci-
sion-making structure are con
fl
ned to environmental areas that are considered secondary
problems by the key Mercosur bodies. Hochstetler (2003,p. 15) notes, 'Given the limited
agenda and powers of the Environmental Sub-committee, it is not surprising that SGT6
fi
