Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
state-owned banks, to a small number of what turned out to be very large conglomerates
(Amsden, 1989; Jones and Sakong, 1980; Rhee et al., 1984; Westphal, 1981). Those
rms
relied on the government's Foreign Capital Inducement Act to severely restrict foreign
investment and rigorously review foreign
fi
rms' requests for licensing and technical assis-
tance agreements so as to ensure that such agreements hastened the building of local tech-
nological capabilities (Mardon, 1990). Governments in Indonesia and Thailand adopted
similar strategies but were less capable than Korea (Rock, 2000; 1995; 1994; MacIntyre,
2000; 1994). Despite this fact, governments in both targeted promotional privileges to a
relatively few but very large national
fi
rms engaged in joint ventures with large developed-
country multinational corporations (Rock, 1999; 1994). As in Korea, those
fi
rms domi-
nated the industrial economy and initially served the local rather than export markets.
Over time, promotional privileges shifted to encourage the export of manufactures.
Singapore and Malaysia focused on creating an institutional framework and develop-
ing the physical infrastructure and human capital to attract multinationals from devel-
oped countries (Hu
fi
, 1999; Times Academic Press, 1993; Rasiah, 1995). In both,
investment promotion agencies scoured the globe for
ff
rms and industries to attract, and
export processing zones (EPZs) were built to meet foreign investors' needs for reliable,
high-quality and reasonably priced infrastructure services. Both also invested in skilled
labor, controled wage rates, and severely restricted workers' rights to unionize and strike
(Hu
fi
, 1999; and Jomo and Todd, 1994). Initially, this approach did not assume the neces-
sity of creating an indigenously owned industrial base or an indigenous class of entre-
preneurs, but eventually the model was extended to include the participation of
indigenous SMEs in the global value chains coordinated by OECD multinationals (Battat
et al., 1996; Rasiah, 2001). This was accomplished through local industry upgrading pro-
grammes or vendor development programmes that linked investment promotion agencies,
multinationals and local supplying SMEs in long-term relationships.
ff
Policy integration
Initially, governments in all these economies followed 'grow
rst, clean up later' environ-
mental strategies. But once the costs of environmental degradation became visible, gov-
ernments built e
fi
ective command-and-control environmental agencies. Those agencies
set ambient and emissions standards, monitored performance relative to standards, and
enforced standards by imposing duties on polluters (Rock, 2002). In the most successful
cases, ambient air and water quality approached that in economies in the OECD (Angel
and Rock, 2003).
But a number of governments went further by integrating their command-and-control
environmental agencies into the institutions of industrial policy. While this linkage,
labeled policy integration by Rock and Angel (2006), took di
ff
erent
political economies, it drove further improvements in ambient environmental quality, con-
tributed to reductions in environmental intensities in speci
ff
erent forms in di
ff
c industries, and encouraged
shifts from pollution abatement to pollution prevention and clean production.
The speci
fi
cantly across economies. In Singapore,
policy integration was achieved by linking the promotional decisions of the Economic
Development Board (EDB), an investment promotion agency, to the infrastructure deci-
sions of its premier infrastructure agency, the Jurong Town Corporation, and by requir-
ing
fi
cs of policy integration varied signi
fi
fi
rms receiving support from these agencies to meet the environmental requirements
