Chemistry Reference
In-Depth Information
scientists. In the pluralist world of modern science, there is no privileged model that
is granted metaphysical status, i.e. the broad-brush entitlement of universality that
exempt it from clearly delineating its field of application by scientific arguments.
Finally, if a theory of one (sub-)discipline is able to explain a phenomenon or
property to the satisfaction of another (sub-)discipline, that counts as a successful
case of interdisciplinarity, which makes all parts happy. A case in point would be
the quantum chemical explanation of the specific electric conductivity or chemical
bonding energy of a substance. Properties, particularly the operationalized ones in
the experimental sciences, are not proprietary of a discipline but common ground.
Interdisciplinarity consists in sharing and reconfiguring conceptual resources from
different origins for the mutual benefit or the solution of a cross-disciplinary issue.
Reframing such practice in terms of reduction of one discipline to another would
not only miss the conceptual efforts required on both sides, but also introduce
hierarchical thinking that is hostile to interdisciplinary collaboration.
In sum, it is difficult to make philosophical sense of the epistemological reduction
of one discipline to another. The only cases that can reasonably be discussed, when
the area of intended applications of one theory is a subset of that of another, are
typical issues of scientific debate, for which philosophers have no particular compe-
tence to contribute. They do have, however, for investigating conceptual and meth-
odological differences between disciplines, which makes interdisciplinarity issues a
much more promising and useful field of philosophical studies than reduction.
5.7 Realism Revisited
Since the 1970s, philosophers of science have discussed a view they call “scientific
realism”. Although there exist now dozens of versions, they all share the opposition
to “instrumentalism”, the view that scientific concepts and theories are judged
according to their usefulness regarding epistemic aims such as prediction, expla-
nation, classification, synthesis, and so on. However, “instrumentalism” is a truism
in science and elsewhere: the epistemic value of something is always assessed on
the basis of whether it helps us pursue certain epistemic aims. Within the pluralist
constitution of science, it is even necessary to point out for what particular episte-
mic aim a scientific concept or model is good for in order to improve the division of
scientific labor.
The adherents of “scientific realism” instead seek intrinsic values in theories that
are independent of epistemic aims, or any aim whatsoever. They claim that certain
theories are in a not further explicable way “true”.
1
The search for such theories
1
If the truth conditions of a theory consist in all sentences that can possibly be deduced from the
theory plus specific assumptions, as a standard view maintains, that would amount to all its
possible explanations (postdictions) and predictions. Yet, “scientific realism” wants a theory to
be more, making truth an obscure notion.
